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______________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
______________ 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 John and Carolyn Jackson (“John” and “Carolyn”) were 
convicted of conspiracy to endanger the welfare of a child and 
endangering the welfare of a child under New Jersey law—
offenses that were “assimilated” into federal law pursuant to the 
Assimilative Crimes Act (“ACA”).  The United States District 
Court for the District of New Jersey sentenced Carolyn to 24 
months of imprisonment (as well as three years of supervised 
release).  John received a sentence of three years of probation 
(together with 400 hours of community service and a $15,000 
fine).  The government appeals from these sentences.   
 
 We will vacate the sentences and remand for 
resentencing.  Concluding that there is no “sufficiently 
analogous” offense guideline, the District Court declined to 
calculate Defendants’ applicable sentencing ranges under the 
Guidelines.  Although we adopt an “elements-based” approach 
for this inquiry, we conclude that the assault guideline is 
“sufficiently analogous” to Defendants’ offenses of conviction.  
Furthermore, the District Court failed to make the requisite 
findings of fact—under the applicable preponderance of the 
evidence standard—with respect to this Guidelines calculation 
as well as the application of the statutory sentencing factors.  
We also agree with the government that the District Court, while 
it could consider what would happen if Defendants had been 
prosecuted in state court, simply went too far in this case by 
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focusing on state sentencing practices to the exclusion of federal 
sentencing principles.  Finally, the sentences themselves were 
substantively unreasonable. 
    
I. 
 
 John, a major in the United States Army, and Carolyn, his 
wife, were the biological parents of three children, including 
“JJ.”  They also became the foster parents of three young 
children:  Joshua (born on May 13, 2005), “J” (born on April 1, 
2006), and “C” (born on April 7, 2008).  The three children were 
eventually adopted.  Joshua died on May 8, 2008. 
 
 Defendants were charged in a fifteen-count superseding 
indictment.  These counts can be organized into three different 
categories:  an assimilated state conspiracy charge, assimilated 
state substantive offenses, and substantive charges under federal 
law.  These offenses occurred (at least in part) within the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, i.e., at 
Picatinny Arsenal Installation in Morris County, New Jersey. 
      
 Count 1 charged John and Carolyn with conspiracy to 
endanger the welfare of a child—Joshua, J, and C—under N.J. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:24-4a and 2C:5-2—assimilated pursuant to the 
ACA.  From August 2005 through April 23, 2010, Defendants, 
“for the purpose of promoting and facilitating conduct which 
endangered the welfare of a child, did agree with each other to 
engage in acts which constituted endangering the welfare of a 
child whom they had assumed responsibility for and accepted a 
legal duty to care for, namely, [Joshua, J, and C].”  (A35-A36.)  
They carried out this conspiracy by, inter alia, physically 
assaulting the children with various objects and with their hands, 
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withholding proper medical care (and failing to seek prompt 
medical attention for Joshua and C), withholding sufficient 
nourishment from the children (and adequate water from J and 
C), forcing J and C to consume food that caused them pain and 
suffering, such as red pepper flakes, hot sauce, and/or raw 
onion, causing C to ingest excessive sodium or sodium-laden 
substances, and employing cruel and neglectful disciplinary and 
child-rearing techniques. 
  
 Counts 2 to 12 and Count 15 charged offenses under 
assimilated New Jersey law for endangering the welfare of a 
child (and aiding and abetting such endangerment) in violation 
of § 2C:24-4a and 18 U.S.C. § 2.  Specifically, Defendants 
allegedly caused harm to the children in various ways, made 
them “neglected” children, and children “upon whom cruelty 
had been inflicted, as defined in N.J.S.A. Sections 9:6-1 and 
9:6-3.”  (A39-A49, A52.)  Counts 2 and 7 alleged that 
Defendants withheld sufficient nourishment and food from 
Joshua and C, respectively.  Counts 4 and 8 similarly alleged 
that they withheld adequate water from J and C and prohibited 
these two children from drinking water.  Counts 3, 6, and 12 
charged that Defendants “physically assault[ed] [Joshua, J, and 
C, respectively] with various objects and with their hands.” 
(A40, A43, A49.)  In Counts 5 and 9, it was alleged that 
Defendants forced J “to ingest hot sauce, red pepper flakes, and 
raw onion” (A42) and C “to ingest hot sauce and red pepper 
flakes” (A46).  Count 10 claimed that Defendants “caus[ed] [C] 
to ingest excessive sodium and a sodium-laden substance while 
restricting [C’s] fluid intake, causing [C] to suffer 
hypernatremia and dehydration, a life threatening condition.”  
(A47.)   Count 11 then charged Defendants with withholding 
prompt and proper medical care for C’s dehydration and 
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elevated sodium levels.  Finally, Count 15 alleged that 
Defendants withheld prompt and proper medical care for C’s 
fractured humerus. 
      
 Defendants were also accused of assaulting C with a 
dangerous weapon with intent to do bodily harm (and aiding and 
abetting this assault) in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(3) and 
2 (Count 13) as well as with intentionally assaulting C (and 
aiding and abetting such an assault) resulting in serious bodily 
injury in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 113(a)(6) and § 2 (Count 14). 
 
 Trial commenced on April 13, 2015, and lasted 39 days.1 
 At the close of the government’s case, the District Court 
granted judgments of acquittal on Counts 13 and 14.  On July 8, 
2015, the jury returned guilty verdicts on Counts 1 to 12 as to 
Carolyn and on Counts 1, Counts 3 to 9, and Counts 11 to 12 as 
to John.  Accordingly, both Defendants were acquitted on Count 
15 (renumbered as Count 13), and John was found not guilty on 
Counts 2 and 10. 
   
 Using the offense guidelines for assault, U.S.S.G. § 
2A2.3, and aggravated assault, U.S.S.G. § 2A2.2, the Probation 
Office calculated both Defendants’ Guidelines range as 210 to 
262 months.  The government similarly calculated a sentencing 
range of 292 to 365 months.  It sought sentences of 235 months 
for Carolyn and 188 months for John.  A 10 1/2-hour sentencing 
was held on December 15, 2015.  At the sentencing hearing, the 
District Court rendered an especially thorough ruling on the 
record.  Declining to calculate a Guidelines sentence, it 
                                              
 
1 An earlier trial ended in a mistrial when the government 
asked a question suggesting that Joshua was no longer alive.    
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ultimately sentenced Carolyn to a term of imprisonment of 24 
months (as well as three years of supervised release).  John was 
sentenced to three years of probation (as well as 400 hours of 
community service and a $15,000 fine).2 
 
II. 
 
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  This Court has appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3742(b).  As required by § 3742(b), the Solicitor 
General personally authorized the government to appeal. 
                                              
 2 The District Court also struck the assertions regarding 
the offense conduct set forth in the Presentence Investigation 
Reports (“PSRs”) because they were written by the government, 
no independent investigation was conducted by the Probation 
Office, no countervailing evidence was referenced, and certain 
paragraphs were related to extraneous guidelines.  
 
 Additionally, the District Court had the benefit of a 
lengthy decision by the Appellate Division of the New Jersey 
Superior Court, which affirmed the judicial determination that 
Defendants abused and neglected J, C, and JJ and the 
termination of their parental rights as to these three children but 
reversed the state family judge’s finding of abuse and neglect 
with respect to two other children [their other two biological 
children].  See  N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. C.J., 
2014 WL 3881311 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 8, 2014) (per 
curiam); see also N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. C.J., 
2016 WL 4608231 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Sept. 6, 2016) (per 
curiam) (holding that trial court erred in granting kinship legal 
guardianship as to the two biological children).    
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 This case implicates a number of rather unusual 
sentencing issues.  This is not surprising because Defendants 
were not convicted and sentenced for committing enumerated 
federal crimes of the sort that federal courts consider on a 
regular basis.   Instead, they were convicted and sentenced in 
federal court for state law offenses “assimilated” into federal 
law pursuant to a federal statute, the ACA.  The ACA provides 
that: 
 
Whoever within or upon any of the places now 
existing or hereafter reserved or acquired as 
provided in section 7 of this title, or on, above, or 
below any portion of the United States not within 
the jurisdiction of any State, Commonwealth, 
territory, possession, or district is guilty of any act 
or omission which, although not made punishable 
by any enactment of Congress, would be 
punishable if committed or omitted within the 
jurisdiction of the State, Territory, Possession, or 
District in which such place is situated, by the 
laws thereof in force at the time of such act or 
omission, shall be guilty of a like offense and 
subject to a like punishment. 
 
18 U.S.C. § 13(a).  This statute, which in its original form dates 
back to the 1820s, is designed to borrow state laws in order to 
fill gaps that exist in federal criminal laws with respect to 
criminal offenses that are committed on federal enclaves.  See, 
e.g., Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 160-61 (1998). 
     
 However, setting aside these special circumstances, we 
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look to the generally applicable post-Booker sentencing process. 
 The sentencing court must engage in the following three-step 
process:  (1) calculate the defendant’s (now advisory) 
Guidelines range; (2) formally rule on the parties’ motions for 
departure and, if a motion is granted, state how the departure 
affects the Guidelines calculation; and (3) consider the statutory 
sentencing factors specified in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and 
determine the appropriate sentence to impose.  See, e.g., United 
States v. Tomko, 562 F.3d 558, 567 (3d Cir. 2014) (en banc).  
We review sentences for both procedural as well as substantive 
reasonableness.  See, e.g., id.   
    
III. 
 
A. “Sufficiently Analogous” Offense Guidelines 
 
 We begin, as we must, with the Guidelines.  Pursuant to 
U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1, the sentencing court, in cases where the 
offense is a felony for which no guideline expressly has been 
promulgated, applies the “most analogous” offense guideline.  
Defendants are correct that this Court should adopt an 
“elements-based” approach to this inquiry—which calls for a 
comparison between the elements of the offense of conviction 
with the purportedly analogous offense guideline and the 
elements of the various federal offenses covered by this 
guideline.  However, we also agree with the government that, 
under this approach, the assault guideline is “sufficiently 
analogous” to Defendants’ offenses of conviction.  The District 
Court accordingly committed reversible error by concluding that 
there is no “sufficiently analogous” offense guideline in this 
case. 
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 The “Applications Instructions” direct the sentencing 
court to begin by “[d]etermin[ing], pursuant to § 1B1.2 
(Applicable Guidelines), the offense guideline section from 
Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) applicable to the offense of 
conviction.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(a)(1) (citing U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2).  
U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(a) (“Applicable Guidelines”) states, inter alia, 
that the sentencing court should “[d]etermine the offense 
guideline section in Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) applicable 
to the offense of conviction (i.e., the offense conduct charged in 
the count of the indictment or information of which the 
defendant was convicted).”  This guideline provides basic 
instructions on how to identify the offense guideline section: 
     
Refer to the Statutory Index (Appendix A) to 
determine the Chapter Two offense guideline, 
referenced in the Statutory Index for the offense 
of conviction.  If the offense involved a 
conspiracy, attempt, or solicitation, refer to 
§2X1.1 (Attempt, Solicitation, or Conspiracy) as 
well as the guideline referenced in the Statutory 
Index for the substantive offense.  For statutory 
provisions not listed in the Statutory Index, use 
the most analogous guideline.  See § 2X5.1 
(Other Offenses). 
   
Id. 
 
 The Sentencing Commission’s commentary explains that 
§ 1B1.1 provides the basic rules for determining the guideline 
applicable to the offense conduct under Chapter Two (Offense 
Conduct).  “The court is to use the Chapter Two guideline 
section referenced in the Statutory Index (Appendix A) for the 
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offense of conviction.”  U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2 cmt. n.1.  “However, . 
. . for statutory provisions not listed in the Statutory Index, the 
most analogous guideline, determined pursuant to § 2X5.1 
(Other Offenses), is to be used.”  Id.  “In the case of a particular 
statute that proscribes only a single type of criminal conduct, the 
offense of conviction and the conduct proscribed by the statute 
will coincide, and the Statutory Index will specify only one 
offense guideline for that offense of conviction.”  Id.  The 
commentary to §1B1.2 also deals with the situation where the 
particular statute proscribes a variety of conduct that might 
constitute the subject of different offense guidelines—and the 
Statutory Index specifies more than one offense guideline for 
that particular statute:  “[T]he court will determine which of the 
referenced guideline sections is most appropriate for the offense 
conduct charged in the count of which the defendant was 
convicted.”  Id.  “For statutory provisions not listed in the 
Statutory Index, the most analogous guideline is to be used.  See 
§ 2X5.1 (Other Offenses”).”  Id.; see also id. (“If the offense 
involved a conspiracy, attempt, or solicitation, refer to §2X.1 
(Attempt, Solicitation, or Conspiracy) as well as the guideline 
referenced in the Statutory Index for the substantive offense.”). 
   
 U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1 (“Other Felony Offense”) states the 
following: 
 
If the offense is a felony for which no guideline 
expressly has been promulgated, apply the most 
analogous offense guideline.  If there is not a 
sufficiently analogous guideline, the provisions of 
18 U.S.C. § 3553 shall control, except that any 
guidelines and policy statements that can be 
applied meaningfully in the absence of a Chapter 
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Two offense guideline shall remain applicable. 
 
If the defendant is convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 
1841(a)(1), apply the guideline that covers the 
conduct the defendant is convicted of having 
engaged in, as that conduct is described in 18 
U.S.C. § 1841(a)(1) and listed in 18 U.S.C. § 
1841(b). 
 
 The commentary to § 2X5.1 states in relevant part that 
this guideline applies only to felony offenses not referenced to 
Appendix A (Statutory Index) (and accordingly U.S.S.G. § 
2X5.2 (Class A Misdemeanors (Not Covered by Another 
Specific Offense Guideline)) should be used for Class A 
misdemeanors)).  U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1 cmt. n.3.  It then states: 
 
Background:  Many offenses, especially 
assimilative crimes, are not listed in the Statutory 
Index or in any of the lists of Statutory Provisions 
that follow each offense guideline.  Nonetheless, 
the specific guidelines that have been 
promulgated cover the type of criminal behavior 
that most such offenses proscribe.  The court is 
required to determine if there is a sufficiently 
analogous offense guideline, and, if so, to apply 
the guideline that is most analogous.  In a case in 
which there is no sufficiently analogous guideline, 
the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3553 control. 
 
The sentencing guidelines apply to convictions 
under 18 U.S.C. § 13 (Assimilative Crimes Act) 
and 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (Indian Major Crimes Act); 
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see 18 U.S.C. § 3551(a), as amended by section 
1602 of Public Law 101-647. 
 
Id. cmt. background. 
 
 There are three basic tests that could be used to identify a 
“sufficiently analogous” offense guideline:  (1) an “elements-
based” approach, i.e., “[w]hether there is a sufficiently 
analogous guideline to a particular crime is generally a task of 
comparing the elements of the defendant’s crime of conviction 
to the elements of federal offenses already covered by a specific 
guideline,” United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1270 (10th 
Cir. 1999) (citing United States v. Allard, 164 F.3d 1146, 1149 
(8th Cir. 1999); United States v. Osborne, 164 F.3d 434, 437 
(8th Cir. 1999)); (2) “comparing various Guidelines to ‘the facts 
alleged in the indictment’” (Appellant’s Brief at 28 (quoting 
United States v. McEnry, 659 F.3d 893, 899-901 (9th Cir. 
2011))); or (3) a broader approach in which the sentencing court 
must take into account all of the circumstances and make factual 
findings to support its ultimate selection.  Although it contends 
that “the assault Guidelines are sufficiently analogous offense 
Guidelines” under the “elements-based” approach (id. at 33), the 
government asks the Court to adopt the second test, what we call 
the “indictment-facts” approach.  We, however, determine that 
the “elements-based” approach should apply.3   
 
 Initially, the precedential “indictment-facts” case law 
cited by the government generally “pertain to the scope of 
                                              
 
3 No one suggests that the sentencing court should decide 
whether there is a “sufficiently analogous” offense guideline 
based on its own findings of fact.   
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inquiry when more than one guideline is assigned to a statute or 
when no guideline is assigned and the court determines that 
more than one guideline is sufficiently analogous [and must 
therefore select the ‘most analogous’ offense guideline].”  
(John’s Brief at 24.)  In United States v. Boney, 769 F.3d 153 
(3d Cir. 2014), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 1003 (2015), this Court 
concluded that the district court failed to select the “most 
appropriate” offense guideline for the offense conduct charged 
in the counts of which the defendant was convicted pursuant to 
Application Note 1 of § 1B1.2, id. at 154-63.  Likewise, we 
considered in United States v. Aquino, 555 F.3d 124 (3d Cir. 
2009), which of two offense guidelines specified in the Statutory 
Index for a particular federal offense was the “most appropriate” 
guideline under this § 1B1.2 commentary and then applied the 
respective offense guidelines’ cross-references, id. at 125-31.  In 
another Third Circuit case cited by the government, we 
specifically addressed several issues that arose as a consequence 
of the sentencing court applying the “most analogous” offense 
guideline.  United States v. Cherry, 10 F.3d 1003, 1005 (3d Cir. 
2003) (“This appeal requires us to decide several issues which 
arise when the United States Sentencing Guidelines . . . do not 
contain a provision expressly applicable to the offense for which 
a defendant has been convicted and the district court applies a 
guideline deemed to be most analogous to the offense of 
conviction.”).   
   
 While the government does not cite to any precedential 
opinion adopting its understanding of the “sufficiently 
analogous” guideline inquiry,4 the Fifth, Eighth, and Tenth 
                                              
 
4 In a § 2X5.1 appeal, the Ninth Circuit refused to express 
an opinion “as to whether the district court’s look to the 
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Circuits have adopted the “elements-based” approach.  This 
approach began with the Eighth Circuit’s 1999 ruling in United 
States v. Osborne, 164 F.3d 434 (8th Cir. 1999). 
 
 According to the Eighth Circuit, “[t]he first step of the 
USSG § 2X5.1 analysis is to determine whether there are any 
guidelines which are sufficiently analogous to the defendant’s 
crime; if there are no sufficiently analogous guidelines, then 
the defendant is to be sentenced using the general provisions 
of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b),” id. at 437 (footnote omitted) (citing 
United States v. Cefalu, 85 F.3d 964, 966-69 (2d Cir. 1996)).  
The Osborne court held that a de novo standard of review 
applies to this initial step because, among other things, “the 
issue most generally will involve comparing the elements of 
federal offenses to the elements of the crime of conviction.”  
Id.; see also id. (“Secondly, a determination that there is not a 
sufficiently analogous guideline will require the district court 
to impose sentence under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b), which we are 
convinced is a legal issue.”).  
                                                                                                     
allegations in the indictment to select the appropriate guideline 
would have been permissible in this case.”  United States v. 
McEnry, 659 F.3d 893, 901 n.13 (9th Cir. 2011).  “Moreover, 
because this case does not present a situation where more than 
one guideline is ‘sufficiently analogous’ to McEnry’s crime of 
conviction, U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1, we express no opinion about 
whether the court might be permitted to look to more facts in 
such a case.”  Id.  An unpublished per curiam disposition by the 
Fourth Circuit was the only decision cited by the government 
that looked to the facts alleged in the indictment as part of its 
“sufficiently analogous” guideline analysis.  See United States v. 
Centner, 116 F.3d 473, at *1-*4 (4th Cir. 1997) (per curiam). 
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 The government takes issue with this ruling, claiming 
that the Eighth Circuit offered no support for its approach.  But 
the Osborne court did offer a persuasive explanation based on 
the Background Note to § 2X5.1 and the distinction the 
Sentencing Commission draws between a “sufficiently 
analogous” offense guideline, on the one hand, and the “most 
analogous” such guideline, on the other hand: 
 
 The background note to USSG § 2X5.1 
states specifically, “The court is required to 
determine if there is a sufficiently analogous 
guideline and, if so, to apply the guideline that is 
most analogous.  Where there is no sufficiently 
analogous guideline, the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(b) control.”  USSG 2X5.1, comment. 
(backg’d).  This portion of the application note 
mandates a two-step analysis, and makes 
abundantly clear that there is a difference between 
a situation where the district judge is choosing the 
most analogous guideline among sufficiently 
analogous guidelines, and a situation where there 
is no sufficiently analogous guideline.  In 
construing the guideline and the application note, 
we must give meaning to each of these terms. 
 
Id.5 
                                              
 
5 The Eighth Circuit thereby quoted from an older version 
of the commentary.  However, the current version of this 
language is essentially indistinguishable.  See § 2X5.1 cmt. 
background (“The court is required to determine if there is a 
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 The Eighth Circuit went on to conclude that a deferential 
standard of review applies to the district court’s “most 
analogous” guideline selection, indicating that the district court 
must take into account the circumstances of the case and make 
its own factual findings.  Id. at 437-38.  “Absent an indication 
that the district court misunderstood the legal standards, that is, 
it misunderstood the elements of the state offense or the 
analogous federal offenses, we will defer to its judgment as to 
how the facts fit into those elements.”  Id. at 438 (citing United 
States v. Mariano, 983 F.2d 1150, 1158 (1st Cir. 1993)).  
Furthermore, the Osborne court noted that choosing the “most 
analogous” offense guideline involves more than just 
interpretation of the various guidelines (but instead implicates 
the applicability of different guidelines to the facts).  Id. 
   
 In this case, the government agrees with the Eighth 
Circuit that “[w]hether there is a sufficiently analogous offense 
Guideline is a legal question subject to plenary review.”  
(Appellant’s Brief at 25 (citing United States v. Cothran, 286 
F.3d 173, 176-77 (3d Cir. 2002); Aquino, 555 F.3d at 127).)  
According to the Osborne court, the divergent standards of 
review strike the appropriate balance between avoiding 
unwarranted sentencing disparities and imposing individualized 
sentences.  Id.  “With appellate courts reviewing the sufficiency 
question de novo, defendants will not receive sentences based 
on wholly inapplicable guidelines.”  Id.  Nevertheless, § 2X5.1 
                                                                                                     
sufficiently analogous offense guideline, and, if so, to apply the 
guideline that is most analogous.  In a case in which there is no 
sufficiently analogous guideline, the provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 
3553 control.”)    
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cases “are inherently out of the ordinary; the Commission does 
not offer a predetermined guideline or offense level.”  Id.  “By 
giving due deference to the district court’s choice of the most 
analogous guideline, district courts will have more freedom to 
fashion the appropriate sentence in these unconventional 
situations on a case by case basis.”  Id.; see also United States v. 
Allard, 164 F.3d 1146, 1147-50 (8th Cir. 1999) (companion case 
to Osborne applying same principles).  
  
 The Fifth Circuit as well as the Tenth Circuit have 
followed the Eighth Circuit’s example by comparing the 
elements of the defendant’s offense of conviction with the 
elements of federal offenses covered by a specific offense 
guideline in order to ascertain whether, as a legal matter, this 
guideline is “sufficiently analogous” to the offense of 
conviction.  See, e.g., United States v. Rakes, 510 F.3d 1280, 
1287-88 (10th Cir. 2007); United States v. Calbat, 266 F.3d 358, 
363 (5th Cir. 2001); Nichols, 169 F.3d at 1269-71. 
   
 In support for its assertion that a plenary standard of 
review applies to this inquiry, the government cites to our 
opinion in United States v. Cothran, 286 F.3d 173 (3d Cir. 
2002).  Cothran strongly weighs in favor of the “elements-
based” approach.    
 
 In that case, the defendant was convicted of conveying 
false information and threats about carrying an explosive device 
on an airplane in violation of 49 U.S.C. § 46507, and he 
contested the district court’s “finding that the United States 
Sentencing Guideline (U.S.S.G.) § 2A6.1 [(Threatening or 
Harassing Communications)] was the most analogous offense 
guideline for Cothran’s crime [as opposed to U.S.S.G. § 2K1.5 
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(Possessing Dangerous Weapons or Materials While Boarding 
or Abroad an Aircraft)].”  Id. at 174.  Observing that the courts 
are split vis-à-vis the applicable standard of review, we turned to 
Osborne’s “comprehensive and cogent analysis of the standard 
to be applied.”  Id. at 176.   
 
 “The [Eighth Circuit] noted that there is a two-step 
process involved:  first, the district court must determine 
whether there is a sufficiently analogous offense guideline, 
and, if there is, it then must determine which guideline is most 
analogous.”  Id. at 177 (citing Osborne, 164 F.3d at 437).  It 
“held that the first step, determining whether there is a 
sufficiently analogous guideline, is a legal question and is 
reviewed de novo.”  Id. (citing Osborne, 164 F.3d at 437).  
According to Cothran, the Osborne court correctly identified 
the standard of review to apply to the first step “[b]ecause 
determining whether there is an analogous guideline is 
substantially interpreting and applying the guidelines.”  Id.  
The Cothran Court then accepted Osborne’s “logical” analysis 
with respect to the “most analogous” guideline inquiry, 
applying a deferential standard of review as to the district 
court’s factual findings and application of the guidelines to 
these facts.  Id. (citing Calbat, 266 F.3d at 363 n.1). 
   
 While the Cothran Court did not specifically mention 
Osborne’s “elements” language (and did not actually conduct 
the initial “sufficiently analogous” guideline inquiry), we did 
express approval for the Eighth Circuit’s “cogent” analysis of 
the applicable standards of review.  The Eighth Circuit adopted 
these standards for the “sufficiently analogous” guideline 
inquiry specifically because the first step would require district 
courts to look only to the elements, while the second step would 
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require factual findings.  Cothran thus adopted the elements-
based inquiry from Osborne.    
            
 Even though we must look to the respective elements, we 
stress that this inquiry must be conducted in a flexible and open-
ended fashion.  After all: 
 
Numerous sections of the sentencing guidelines 
direct the court to apply the offense level of the 
federal offense most “analogous” to a particular 
unlawful activity; it would be unreasonable to 
read into every one of these sections the 
requirement that, in order to apply the analogous 
offense guideline, the sentencing court must 
effectively retry the defendant for an otherwise 
unrelated offense.  “[A]nalogy does not mean 
identity.  It implies difference.”  Sturm v. Ulrich, 
10 F.2d 9, 11 (8th Cir. 1925). 
    
United States v. Langley, 919 F.2d 926, 930-31 & n.8 (5th Cir. 
1990) (citing inter alia § 2X5.1).  In turn, the Tenth Circuit 
explained that “the court first had to ask what analogous 
provisions were within the ballpark; it then had to ask which 
represented the best fit.”  Rakes, 510 F.3d at 1287.  “We 
generally compare the elements of the defendant’s crime to the 
elements of federal offenses already covered by specific 
Guidelines sections to ascertain which plausible analogies exist 
for sentencing.”  Id. at 1288 (citing Nichols, 169 F.3d at 1270).  
In Allard (decided on the same day as Osborne), the Eighth 
Circuit similarly observed that, “by definition, analogous 
guidelines do not and need not perfectly match the defendant’s 
crime.”  Allard, 164 F.3d at 1149 (citing United States v. Terry, 
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86 F.3d 353, 358 (4th Cir. 1996)).  While the inquiry may still 
be “bounded by the elements of the offense of conviction” 
(John’s Brief at 23), a perfect match of elements is not necessary 
(or even expected).  Instead, the proffered guideline need only 
be within the same proverbial “ballpark” as the offense of 
conviction. 
 
 This “ballpark” or “plausible analogy” notion actually 
makes a lot of sense in the ACA context.  It is undisputed that 
“assimilated crimes, by definition, have no perfect matches 
among federal offenses”—otherwise they would not be 
assimilated under the terms of the ACA itself.  (Appellant’s 
Brief at 32 (citing Lewis v. United States, 523 U.S. 155, 164-72 
(1988)).)  The Background Note to § 2X5.1 explains that many 
offenses, particularly “assimilative offenses,” are not listed in 
the Statutory Index or in any of the lists of statutory provisions 
that follow each guideline—“Nonetheless, the specific 
guidelines that have been promulgated cover the type of 
criminal behavior that most such offenses proscribe.”  § 2X5.1 
cmt. background.  The Sentencing Commission thereby 
contemplates that most assimilated offenses will actually have a 
“sufficiently analogous” offense guideline.  In addition, this 
comment “suggests that the most analogous guideline is the one 
that covers the ‘type of criminal behavior’ of which the 
defendant was convicted.”  Calbat, 266 F.3d at 363. 
 
 Accordingly, we now consider whether there is a 
“sufficiently analogous” offense guideline to Defendants’ 
offenses of conviction.  We begin by setting forth the assault 
(and aggravated assault) guidelines and the related federal 
offenses.  The Court then turns to the state statutory provisions 
at issue here and (in particular) the jury instructions addressing 
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the elements of the assimilated New Jersey offense of 
endangering the welfare of a child.  Having done so, we 
compare the respective elements.  In the end, we conclude that 
Defendants’ offenses of conviction, the assault guideline, and 
the federal offense of simple assault are within the same 
proverbial “ballpark.” 
 
 The “Assault” guideline, U.S.S.G. § 2A2.3, “applies to 
misdemeanor assault and battery and to any felonious assault not 
covered by § 2A2.2 (Aggravated Assault).”  § 2A2.2 cmt. 
background.  The commentary to § 2A2.2, in turn, defines 
“Aggravated assault” as “a felonious assault that involved (A) a 
dangerous weapon with intent to cause bodily injury (i.e., not 
merely to frighten) with that weapon; (B) serious bodily injury; 
(C) strangling, suffocating, or attempting to strangle or 
suffocate; or (D) an intent to commit another felony.”  § 2A2.2 
cmt. n.1.  “This [aggravated assault] guideline covers felonious 
assaults that are more serious than other assaults because of the 
presence of an aggravating factor, i.e., serious bodily injury; the 
involvement of a dangerous weapon with intent to cause bodily 
injury; strangling, suffocating, or attempting to strangle or 
suffocate; or the intent to commit another felony.”  § 2A2.2 cmt. 
background. 
   
 18 U.S.C. § 113 prohibits “[a]ssaults within the special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction.”  Defendants here were 
charged with (and judgments of acquittal were granted on) 
assault under § 113(a)(3) (“Assault with a dangerous weapon, 
with intent to do bodily harm”) and § 113(a)(6) (“Assault 
resulting in serious bodily injury”).  However, this federal 
provision sets forth additional assault offenses.  For instance, 
“Assault by striking, beating, or wounding,” is punishable by a 
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fine or imprisonment for not more than six months (or, pursuant 
to a 2013 amendment, for not more than one year).  § 113(a)(4); 
see also Pub. L. No. 113-4, § 906, 104 Stat. 478 (2013).  
Pursuant to § 113(a)(5), “[w]hoever, within the special maritime 
and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, is guilty of an 
assault shall be punished as follows: . . . . (5) Simple assault, by 
a fine under this title or imprisonment for not more than six 
months, or both, or, if the victim of the assault is an individual 
who has not attained the age of 16 years, by fine under this title 
or imprisonment for not more than 1 year, or both.” 
   
 The Statutory Index lists more than forty different 
statutory sections for these two offense guidelines.  See 
U.S.S.G. App’x A.  It specifically lists § 2A2.3 for “18 U.S.C. § 
113(a)(5) (Class A misdemeanor provisions only).”  Id.  In other 
words, the assault guideline applies where the victim is under 
the age of sixteen—thereby triggering either a fine or 
imprisonment for not more than one year (or both).  See, e.g., 18 
U.S.C. § 3559(a)(6) (specifying that Class A misdemeanor is 
any offense for which maximum term of imprisonment is one 
year or less but more than six months); U.S.S.G. § 2X5.2 cmt. 
n.1 (“Do not apply this guideline to a Class A misdemeanor that 
has been specifically referenced in Appendix A to another 
Chapter Two guideline.”). 
      
 Turning to the New Jersey statutory scheme, the District 
Court aptly observed that “we are dealing with a less than clear 
statute” (A6688), which “is very unsatisfactory . . . really a 
morass” (A6580).  Specifically, N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:24-4a 
(“Endangering welfare of children”) incorporates definitions of 
basic concepts like abuse and neglect from various provisions of 
Title 9 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated (“Children—
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Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts”).  See, e.g., N.J. Stat. 
Ann. §§ 9:6-1 (“Abuse, abandonment, cruelty and neglect of 
child; what constitutes”), 9:6-3 (“Cruelty and neglect of 
children; crime of fourth degree; remedies”), 9:6-8.21 
(“Definitions”); State v. N.I., 793 A.2d 760, 770 (N.J. Super. Ct. 
App. Div. 2002) (“The imprecision of the Title 9 definitions 
incorporated into N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4a, which caused the 
[Criminal Law Revision] Commission to be ‘not happy’ and to 
recommend the statute only “[w]ith hesitancy,” has come home 
to roost in this case.  It would, of course, be best if N.J.S.A. 
2C:24-4a was self-contained with its own appropriate and 
precise definitions.” (emphasis omitted)).  Furthermore, it 
appears that the same conduct may be prosecuted under § 
2C:24-4a as a crime of the second degree (which happened here) 
or as a fourth degree crime under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 9:6-3.  See, 
e.g., State v. D.A.V., 823 A.2d 34, 34 (N.J. 2003) (Albin, J., 
concurring) (“[T]he same conduct is proscribed in the same 
language; however, when prosecuted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 
2C:24-4, a defendant is exposed to a five- to ten-year state 
prison term, and when prosecuted pursuant to N.J.S.A. 9:6-3, a 
defendant is exposed only to an eighteen-month prison term.  In 
that respect, it appears that those provisions are unique in the 
New Jersey Statutes Annotated.” (emphasis omitted)). 
   
 Under these circumstances, it is understandable the 
parties (especially Defendants) focus on the District Court’s 
(rather extensive) jury instructions. 
 
   Addressing Count 1 (the conspiracy charge) of the 
indictment, the District Court reviewed the elements of the child 
endangerment offense: 
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 The New Jersey statutes upon which 
endangering the welfare of a child are based are 
Sections 2C:24-4a, 9:6-1 and 9:6-3 of the New 
Jersey Statutes Annotated.  Section 2C:24-4a and 
Section 9:6-3 criminalize the act of endangering 
the welfare of a child, and Section 9:6-1 provides 
definitions of what constitutes abuse, 
abandonment, cruelty and neglect of a child. 
 
 At the outset I will read the statutes to you 
and then I will explain how you must apply the 
statutes to the facts of this case by identifying the 
specific elements that the government must prove 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 
 Section 2C:24-4a reads, in pertinent part: 
 
Any person having a legal duty for the care 
of a child or who has assumed 
responsibility for the care of a child who 
causes the child harm that would make the 
child an abused or neglected child . . . is 
guilty of a crime. 
 
 Section 9:6-3 reads, in pertinent part: 
 
Any parent, guardian or person having the 
care, custody or control of any child who 
shall . . . be cruel to or neglectful of such 
child. . . shall be deemed to be guilty of a 
crime . . . .  
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 Turning to the elements, to find Carolyn 
Jackson and John E. Jackson guilty of 
endangering the welfare of a child, the 
government must prove the following elements 
beyond a reasonable doubt: 
 
1. That [Joshua, J, or C] was a child; 
 
2. That the defendant knowingly caused 
the child harm that would make the child 
neglected or knowingly committed an act 
of cruelty against the child; 
 
3. That the defendant knew that such 
conduct would cause the child harm or 
would inflict cruelty upon the child; and 
 
4. That the defendant had a legal duty for 
the care of the child or had assumed 
responsibility for the care of the child.  
 
(A6008-A6009.)  The District Court then explained each 
element, defining the terms “child” (any person under the age 
of eighteen at the time of the offense), “cruelty,” and 
“neglect”: 
 
 The second element that the government 
must prove beyond a reasonable doubt is that 
Carolyn Jackson and John E. Jackson knowingly 
caused the child harm that would make the child 
neglected or knowingly committed an act of 
cruelty against the child.   
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 Section 9:6-1 of the New Jersey Statutes 
Annotated includes the following applicable 
definitions of cruelty and neglect.  As defined 
under Section 9:6-1, the legal definition of abuse 
does not apply in this case. 
 
 Cruelty consists of any of the following 
acts, by anyone having the custody or control of 
the child: 
 
(a) Inflicting unnecessarily severe corporal 
punishment upon a child; 
  
(b) Inflicting upon a child unnecessary 
suffering or pain, either mental or 
physical;  
 
(c) Habitually tormenting, vexing or 
afflicting a child; 
 
(d) Any act of omission or commission 
whereby unnecessary pain and suffering, 
whether mental or physical, is caused or 
permitted to be inflicted on a child; or 
 
(e) Exposing a child to unnecessary 
hardship, fatigue or mental or physical 
strains that may tend to injure the health or 
physical well-being of such child. 
 
Neglect consists in any of the following acts, by 
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anyone having the custody or control of the child: 
 
(a) Failing to provide proper and sufficient 
food, clothing, maintenance . . . medical 
attendance or surgical treatment . . . or 
 
(b) Failure to do or permit to be done any 
act necessary for the child’s physical well-
being. 
 
 In New Jersey, the use of corporal 
punishment is not necessarily unlawful.  The law 
prohibits the infliction of unnecessarily severe 
corporal punishment; however, as a general 
matter, a parent may inflict moderate correction 
such as is reasonable under the circumstances of 
the case.  A parent may not inflict corporal 
punishment that is cruel, as I have just defined for 
you. 
 
(A6010-A6011.)  The District Court explored what is meant by 
acting “knowingly” (e.g., “A person acts knowingly with respect 
to the nature of his or her conduct or the attendant circumstances 
if he or she is aware that the conduct is of that nature or that 
such circumstances exist or the person is aware of a high 
probability of their existence.  A person acts knowingly with 
respect to a result of the conduct if he or she is aware that it is 
practically certain that the conduct will cause a result” (A6011)). 
 It explained how Defendants could be found guilty for 
omissions or the failure to act.  The jury was told that a failure to 
act or an omission can be the basis for criminal liability if the 
government proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
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defendant had a legal duty to act and failed or omitted to 
perform that legal duty with knowledge that this failure was 
practically certain to cause harm.  Additionally, the District 
Court instructed the jury that the government must prove beyond 
a reasonable doubt that each defendant had a legal duty, or 
assumed responsibility, for the care of Joshua, J, or C.  Noting 
that these concepts encompass adoptive and foster parents, the 
District Court stated that “[a] person who has assumed 
responsibility for the care of the child includes any person who 
assumes a general and ongoing responsibility for the child and 
who establishes a continuing or regular supervisory or caretaker 
relationship with the child.”  (A6012.)  
    
 The District Court, after summarizing the factual 
allegations for each substantive count (Counts 2 through 13), 
expressly incorporated its Count 1 instructions in each count.  
For the first substantive charge (Count 2), the written 
instructions provided a little more detail regarding the requisite 
elements:  
 
 I have previously instructed you regarding 
the Assimilative Crimes Act and Endangering the 
Welfare of a Child.  There are two elements that 
the government must prove in a violation of the 
Assimilative Crimes Act: 
 
1. First, that the defendants endangered 
the welfare of a child; and 
 
2.  Second, that the offense occurred 
within the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States. 
 
 30 
 
 Additionally, to prove a violation of 
endangering the welfare of a child in violation of 
New Jersey law, the government must prove: 
 
1. That [Joshua] was a child. 
 
2. That the defendant knowingly caused 
the child harm that would make the child 
neglected or a child upon whom cruelty 
has been inflicted; 
 
3. That the defendant knew that such 
conduct would cause the child harm or 
would inflict cruelty upon the child; and 
 
4. That the defendant had a legal duty for 
the care of the child or had assumed 
responsibility for the care of the child. 
 
 Because I already gave you detailed 
instructions regarding this offense in Count One, I 
will not repeat them.  The same instructions apply 
to this count of the Superseding Indictment. 
 
(A6019-A6020.)   
 
 The jury was also given a written “Good Faith Defense” 
instruction, which stated, among other things that, “[i]f you find 
that Carolyn Jackson and John E. Jackson acted in ‘good faith,’ 
as that term is defined below, that would be a complete defense 
to this charge, because good faith on the part of Carolyn Jackson 
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or John E. Jackson would be inconsistent with his or her acting 
knowingly.”  (A6035.)  According to the District Court: 
 
 A defendant acts in “good faith” when he 
or she did not know that his or her acts or 
omissions were practically certain to cause harm 
to a child, even though that knowledge turns out 
to be inaccurate or incorrect.  Thus, in this case if 
Carolyn Jackson or John E. Jackson made an 
honest mistake or had an honest misunderstanding 
about whether his or her acts or omissions were 
practically certain to cause harm to a child then he 
or she did not act knowingly.  A belief need not 
be objectively reasonable to be held in good faith; 
nevertheless, you may consider whether Carolyn 
Jackson or John E. Jackson’s stated belief that his 
or her acts or omissions were not practically 
certain to cause harm to a child was reasonable as 
a factor in deciding whether the belief was 
honestly or genuinely held. 
 
(Id.)  Defendants did not have the burden of proving good faith. 
 The written instructions summarized the defenses offered by 
Carolyn and John:  (1) the conduct was done in good faith and 
not knowing that Defendants’ acts or omissions were practically 
certain to cause Joshua, J, or C harm (i.e., they did not 
knowingly harm the three children): (2) they merely acted 
negligently or accidentally or otherwise failed to act through 
ignorance or mistake; (3) they did not inflict unnecessarily 
severe corporal punishment; and (4) Defendants did not enter 
into a criminal conspiracy to endanger the welfare of Joshua, J, 
or C.  
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 The written instructions for Counts 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 
and 13 stated that Defendants allegedly caused harm to the 
respective child, “and made [him or her] a neglected child, and a 
child upon whom cruelty has been inflicted, as I have defined 
for you previously, in violation of Title 18, United States Code, 
Sections 13 and 2, and N.J.S.A. Section 2C:24-4a.”  (A6019, 
A6022, A6025-A6026, A6027, A6028-A6029, A6031.)  For 
Counts 3, 5, 6, 9, and 12, the District Court’s instructions did not 
mention the concept of neglect.  Instead, the District Court 
referenced allegations that Defendants caused harm to the 
respective child and made him or her “a child upon whom 
cruelty has been inflicted, as I have defined for you previously, 
in violation of Title 18, United States Code, Sections 13 and 2, 
and N.J.S.A. Section 2C:24-4a.”  (A6021, A6023-A6024, 
A6027, A6030.)  In its oral instructions, the District Court stated 
the following: 
   
 For Counts Two, Four, Seven, Eight, Ten, 
Eleven, and Thirteen, you may find a defendant 
guilty of endangering the welfare of a child based 
on either neglect or cruelty, but all twelve of you 
must unanimously find beyond a reasonable doubt 
that defendant knowingly caused harm to a child 
by either neglecting a child, as I have defined 
previously, or by inflicting cruelty upon a child, as 
I have defined it previously, or both.  The 
government, however, does not have to prove 
both contentions for those Counts Two, Four, 
Seven, Eight, Ten, Eleven and Thirteen, and you 
do not have to unanimously agree that the 
defendant knowingly caused harm by neglecting a 
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child and inflicting cruelty upon a child for those 
counts. 
 
(A5901.) 
 
 We acknowledge that there are some differences between 
the elements of Defendants’ offenses of conviction, on the one 
hand, and the assault guideline and the various federal offenses 
implicated by this guideline (especially the offense of simple 
assault), on the other hand.  Specifically, the expansive elements 
of child endangerment encompass a wide range of actions—and 
inaction.  For instance, the jury was told that cruelty consists of 
not only unnecessarily severe corporal punishment and 
unnecessary physical suffering or pain but also unnecessary 
mental suffering or pain as well as habitual tormenting, vexing, 
or afflicting.  Even the government “argued there was no 
sufficiently analogous offense Guideline for the crimes of 
omission.”  (Appellant’s Brief at 25.)  The government asserts 
that, while the jury could find Defendants guilty on the omission 
charges because they either inflicted cruelty or neglected the 
child, the jury was instructed that, to find them guilty on the 
purported crimes of commission (with the exception of Count 
10), it had to find that they inflicted cruelty.  We observe that 
the jury instructions for Counts 2, 4, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 13, 
specifically referred to both neglect and cruelty, and the District 
Court explained that the jury could find Defendants guilty on 
these charges based on a finding of either neglect or cruelty.  In 
contrast, the instructions for Counts 3, 5, 6, 9, and 12 
exclusively referenced the concept of cruelty.  Nevertheless, the 
District Court also defined “cruelty” as including “[a]ny act of 
omission . . . whereby unnecessary pain and suffering, whether 
mental or physical, is caused or permitted to be inflicted on a 
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child” and “[e]xposing a child to unnecessary hardship, fatigue 
or mental or physical strains that may tend to injure the health or 
physical well-being of such child.”  (A6010.)  
 
 Yet the jury, at least with respect to the cruelty charges, 
still had to find that the government established beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Defendants “knowingly committed an act 
of cruelty against the child.”  (A6009.)  If it is fair to say that the 
New Jersey offense at issue here incorporates a number of 
expansive components, the same could be said with respect to 
the federal assault scheme.  The federal simple assault provision 
encompasses common law battery—the unlawful application of 
force to the person of another, including offensive touching.  
See, e.g., United States v. Delis, 558 F.3d 177, 177-84 (2d Cir. 
2009).  It also includes common law assault, defined as an 
attempted battery or the deliberate infliction upon another of the 
reasonable fear of physical injury.  Id.  In addition, the jury 
instructions did not require the jury to find the degree of harm 
suffered by the children.  The assault guideline as well as the 
federal offense of simple assault, in turn, do not mandate proof 
of any sort of bodily injury or even actual physical contact.6 As 
                                              
 6 While the government noted below that “certain things, 
such as degree of harm or danger are historically elements of 
assault, they are not elements of the crimes for which these 
defendants were convicted” (A6460), such “things” are not 
elements of simple assault.  We further observe that Carolyn’s 
defense counsel indicated that the federal assault counts were 
redundant because “there’s already a charge of neglect by 
administering salt or sodium-laden substances while 
withholding water.”  (A5377.)  At a presentencing hearing 
tentatively addressing, inter alia, how to handle various issues 
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Carolyn explains, assault “requires nothing more than . . . 
placing of the victim in reasonable apprehension of physical 
harm,” and “[n]o injury is required.”  (Carolyn’s Brief at 28.)  
“When the victim of an assault is under 16 years old, an assault 
is punishable by imprisonment for up to one year.”  (Id. (citing § 
113(a)(5)).)  We further note that the jury generally rejected 
Defendants’ “Good Faith Defense,” determining instead that 
they did not make “an honest mistake or had an honest 
misunderstanding about whether his or her acts or omissions 
were practically certain to cause harm to a child.”  (A6035.) 
  
 In turn, it is only to be expected that the offense of 
conviction may include more expansive elements than the 
federal offense or additional elements missing from the federal 
counterpart.  After all, “‘analogy does not mean identity.  It 
implies difference.’”  Langley, 919 F.2d at 931 (quoting Sturm, 
10 F.2d at 11); see also, e.g., Rakes, 510 F.3d at 1287 (stating 
that court first had to ask what analogous provisions were within 
“the ballpark”); Allard, 164 F.3d at 1149 (“[B]y definition, 
analogous guidelines do not and need not perfectly match the 
defendant’s crime.” (citing Terry, 86 F.3d at 358)).  Carolyn 
points out that, when corporal punishment by a parent is the 
basis of a child endangerment charge, the prosecution must 
prove that the punishment was unnecessarily severe or caused 
                                                                                                     
identified in a letter from Carolyn’s attorney (on behalf of both 
Defendants), Carolyn’s attorney took issue with the PSR’s 
identification of “aggravated assault” as “the analogous 
offense.”  (A6083.)  “We think that’s wrong.  Analogous 
offense is what they call a minor assault.  A different guideline.  
We think a matter of law and that could be briefed easily.  And 
if we are right, it eliminates certain enhancements.”  (Id.)   
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unnecessary pain.  According to her, “[t]here is no such 
requirement under the federal assault statute which does not 
address corporal punishment employed by parents.”  (Carolyn’s 
Brief at 34.)  She further observes that, unlike the federal 
scheme, the New Jersey provision requires that the defendant 
either have a legal duty for the care of the child or have assumed 
responsibility for the child.  Yet a jury finding that a defendant, 
for instance, had assumed responsibility for a child and then 
inflicted unnecessarily severe corporal punishment on this child 
by (to give two examples offered by Carolyn herself) “wash[ing] 
her child’s mouth out with soap” or “forcing the ingestion of hot 
sauce” (id. at 35 & n.32 (citations omitted)), would necessarily 
(if implicitly) find that the defendant thereby committed simple 
assault, i.e., an offensive touching.  In fact, Carolyn essentially 
admits this overlap when she claims that “‘parents commit this 
[assault] offense every day of the week in every state in the 
union.”7  (Carolyn’s Brief at 28.)  
                                              
 7 In Cothran, this Court found that a particular offense 
guideline was more analogous than another offense guideline on 
the grounds that, inter alia, the other guideline’s base offense 
level lacked an element of the offense of conviction.  
Specifically, we observed that U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1 (Threatening or 
Harassing Communications) constituted the “most analogous” 
offense guideline because “there is a scienter element present in 
the base offense level for § 2A6.1 that is not present in the base 
offense level of § 2K1.5 [(Possessing Dangerous Weapons or 
Materials While Boarding or Abroad an Aircraft)].”  Cothran, 
286 F.3d at 178.  Accordingly, “[t]o most accurately analogize 
Cothran’s act under § 2K1.5, we would therefore have to 
increase his base offense level to 24 because he knowingly 
conveyed the false threat.”  Id.  As the District Court noted in 
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 Defendants and the District Court rely on a Fifth Circuit 
non-precedential decision:  United States v. Loften, 465 F. 
App’x 294 (5th Cir. 2010) (per curiam).  In this case, the 
defendant was convicted under the ACA for violating a Texas 
criminal provision by causing injury to a child.  Id. at 295.  In 
addition to claiming that the ACA did not incorporate this state 
offense because the federal simple assault provision governed 
his conduct, the defendant argued that, among other things, the 
district court erred by failing to apply the “most analogous” 
offense guideline, i.e., the assault guideline.  Id.  He did not 
raise these arguments below, and the Fifth Circuit concluded 
that he failed to satisfy the plain error standard of review: 
 
However, the district court was obligated to apply 
the Sentencing Guidelines in Loften’s case and 
erred by failing to consider whether an analogous 
Guideline existed that could be used in 
determining Loften’s sentencing range.  See 
[Calbat, 266 F.3d at 362].  That error did not 
affect Loften’s substantial rights.  A review of the 
applicable statutes reveals no analogous 
Guideline. 
                                                                                                     
this case, certain enhancements under the assault and aggravated 
assault guidelines (“the abuse of trust, the vulnerable victim, the 
obstruction of justice”) would appear to apply “to every child 
endangerment charge.”  (A6576.)  However, we addressed the 
issue of whether § 2K1.5 or § 2A6.1 constituted the “most 
analogous” offense guideline—and not whether § 2K1.5 
satisfied the initial “sufficiently analogous” offense guideline 
requirement.  
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Id. at 295.  The government argued in Loften that, under the 
applicable “elements-based” approach, the elements of the 
federal assault offenses implicated by the assault guideline were 
significantly different from the elements of the offense of 
conviction (i.e., § 113(a)(4) does not require that the victim be a 
child under the age of fourteen, the federal simple assault 
provision does not require that the assault cause bodily injury (a 
key element of the Texas offense), and § 113(a)(7) only 
punishes assaults that result in substantial bodily injury to a 
child under the age of sixteen).  As John puts it, “[i]t is 
unsettling that the government calls the position it took in 
Loften ‘mistaken,’ when it took that position to secure a more 
severe sentence for the defendant, but now takes precisely the 
opposite position here, in an effort to secure a draconian 
guideline range and sentence.”  (John’s Brief at 28-29.)  
  
 Nevertheless, we do not place much weight on a non-
precedential ruling from another circuit concluding, without any 
real discussion, that the district court’s failure to consider 
whether there was an analogous offense guideline did not affect 
the defendant’s substantial rights because a review of the 
applicable statutes supposedly revealed no such guidelines.  
Defendants point to nothing binding the government in this 
case—a case implicating assimilated New Jersey law in which 
the Solicitor General granted personal approval to appeal—to 
another United States Attorney’s Office’s position with respect 
to a conviction under assimilated Texas law.  We further note 
that the Texas statutory provision addressed in Loften differs 
from the New Jersey offense at issue here.  Specifically, the 
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Texas provision actually requires proof of bodily injury.8 
   
 The government argues that the District Court’s various 
reasons for rejecting the “assault Guidelines” do not withstand 
scrutiny.  “For example, the Court protested that:  the jury was 
                                              
 
8 In addition, we observe that the aggravated assault 
guideline was applied to a conviction under this Texas bodily 
injury provision in a precedential Fifth Circuit opinion.  United 
States v. Bell, 993 F.2d 427, 430 (5th Cir. 1993) (“In applying 
section 2A2.2, the district court relied on a finding that Bell 
injured his victim with intent to commit another felony—the 
sexual assault.  Relying on his claim that insufficient evidence 
supported the aggravated sexual assault conviction, Bell asserts 
that the district court should have sentenced him under U.S.S.G. 
§ 2A2.3 on the second count.  Because we find Bell’s conviction 
under 18 U.S.C. § 2241(c) fully supported by the record, this 
assignment of error necessarily founders.” (footnote omitted)).  
Finally, this non-precedential Fifth Circuit ruling must be 
weighed against other non-precedential dispositions applying the 
aggravated assault guideline to various assimilated abuse 
convictions.  See United States v. Bailey, 169 F. App’x 815, 
823-24 (5th Cir. 2006) (finding no error in district court’s use of 
aggravated assault guideline as “most analogous” guideline 
offense for conviction for cruelty to juvenile); United States v. 
Truax, 69 F. App’x 219, 220-21 (6th Cir. June 6, 2003) (district 
court applied aggravated assault guideline to conviction for first 
degree criminal abuse of child); Centner, 116 F.3d 473, at *3 
(“As we concluded above, U.S.S.G. §§ 2X2.1 and 2A2.2 are 
sufficiently analogous to warrant their application to Centner’s 
offense [of knowingly and willfully causing children be in place 
where they could be abused].” (footnote omitted)).       
 
 40 
not asked to make the findings contained in the assault 
Guidelines; it would not be ‘justice’ to allow the Court to make 
those findings under the lower [preponderance of the evidence] 
standard of proof that governs all federal sentencings; and it 
would be unfair to allow the Government to charge one statute 
and seek punishment for another.”  (Appellant’s Brief at 37-38 
(citing A6468-A6472, A6477, A6484, A6491, A6558, A6573-
A6578, A6584-A6590, A6703).)  Carolyn offers an extensive 
explanation for why the use of the Guidelines in this case would 
purportedly require impermissible judicial fact-finding.  She 
insists that the sentencing court “cannot find facts which are 
elements of the crime because the Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
give individuals ‘a right to demand that each and every element 
of the alleged crime be submitted to a jury and proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt before sentence is imposed.’”  (Carolyn’s Brief 
at 37 (quoting United States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 
2007) (en banc)).)  While the sentencing court could decide 
whether the offense involved, for example, an abuse of trust 
because such matters have not traditionally been considered 
elements of a crime, it purportedly cannot find facts that have 
traditionally been seen as elements of assault offenses, such as 
the severity of an injury or whether a dangerous weapon was 
used.  “Applying that reasoning to this case, the analogous 
offense cannot be one for which the jury has not found a 
determinative fact.  The defendant cannot be tried for a charge 
for which no significant injury is required and then be 
sentenced as if a finding of such harm had been made. . . . A 
defendant cannot be tried for one crime and sentenced for 
another.”  (Id. at 39 (citing United States v. Lewis, 802 F.3d 
449, 454-55 (3d Cir. 2015)).  According to Carolyn (and the 
District Court itself), it was the government’s own conduct in 
this case that precludes the application of the Guidelines:  “The 
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government rejected a jury charge that would define an abused 
or neglected child as suffering the degree of harm that its 
arguing I should say happened and that the child indeed did 
suffer.  And instead, asking me to make that kind of finding, as 
well as asking me to make that finding on a lower standard of 
proof.  That is tough to swallow.”9  (A6576.) 
                                              
 9 The parties had a disagreement below regarding the 
degree of harm needed to sustain a conviction for endangering 
the welfare of a child under § 2C:24-4a.  Carolyn sought an 
instruction incorporating “the definition of ‘abused or neglected 
child’ contained in N.J.S.A. § 9:6-8.21 or, alternatively, the 
language approved in [a 2002 Appellate Division ruling].”  
(Carolyn’s Brief at 18-19 (citing State v. T.C., 789 A.2d 173, 
186 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2002) (“Abused or neglect child 
means a child . . . whose parent or guardian . . . inflicts . . . 
physical injury . . . which causes or creates a substantial risk of 
protracted impairment of physical or emotional health.”)).)  
While the government opposed this proposal, “to the extent that 
the Court is concerned that at sentencing it would be lacking 
information sufficient to understand the jury’s conclusions about 
the severity of this offense, the government is willing to have 
the Court charge a bifurcated instruction [on degree of harm] in 
verdict form, where the jury is instructed after they’ve reached 
their verdicts on the initial instructions.”  (A5460, see also 
A5467 (“But, you know, we are comfortable as an alternative 
bifurcated verdict, putting before the jury [8.21].”)  Carolyn’s 
attorney stated that “as an alternative we would be comfortable 
instructing everything and giving the lesser included offense, not 
the bifurcation the government is asking for, but a lesser 
included offense.”  (A5469.) 
 
 
 42 
 
 However, Defendants were tried, convicted, and should 
be sentenced for child endangerment (and conspiracy to commit 
child endangerment)—not for assault.  It would have been 
inappropriate for the District Court to charge the jury on 
offenses that were not before it.  It is § 2X5.1 that then requires 
the sentencing court to consider, whenever the offense of 
conviction is a felony for which no offense guideline has been 
promulgated, whether there are any “sufficiently analogous” 
offense guidelines, and, if so, apply the guideline that is “most 
analogous” to the crime of conviction.  No fact-finding is 
required to select the offense guideline because we have 
determined that the “sufficiently analogous” guideline inquiry 
merely implicates a comparison of legal elements—a question of 
law reviewed under a plenary standard of review.  In turn, “by 
definition, analogous guidelines do not and need not perfectly 
match the defendant’s crime.”  Allard, 164 F.3d at 1149 (citing 
Terry, 86 F.3d at 358); see also, e.g., Rakes, 510 F.3d at 1287 
(noting that court first had to ask what provisions were within 
ballpark); Langley, 919 F.2d at 931 (observing that analogy 
implies difference).  Defendants, for their part, do not cite to any 
case law calling into question the constitutionality of § 2X5.1 
itself, and a district court cannot refuse to apply the Guidelines 
                                                                                                     
 The District Court ultimately refused to ask the jury to 
determine the extent of any injuries, while indicating that its 
decision on this point could have an effect at sentencing:  “If the 
government prevails, in terms of not adding this definition of 
substantial harm to the endangerment that’s charged then we 
may have an issue coming up, should there be a conviction, as to 
the extent of culpability, but the government will have 
culpability.”  (A5475.) 
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and calculate an advisory sentencing range because of its 
disagreement with otherwise applicable Guidelines.  United 
States v. Napolitan, 762 F.3d 297, 312-313 (3d Cir. 2014); 
United States v. Gonzalez, 462 F.3d 754, 755 (7th Cir. 2006).  
In fact, the assault guideline would apply even if the jury had 
actually found that Defendants were not guilty of simple assault 
under the federal assault provision.10  See, e.g., Rakes, 510 F.3d 
at 1290 (“Finally, Mr. Rakes contends that it was improper for 
the district court to sentence him under guideline 2A6.1, 
threatening or harassing communications, when the court 
granted him an acquittal on mailing a threatening 
communication, 18 U.S.C. § 876, which falls squarely within 
guideline 2A6.1.  We have, however, rejected this precise 
argument in Nichols.  . . . We affirmed Mr. Nichols’s sentence 
under the first degree murder guideline, finding that it was the 
most analogous, and his acquittal of murder did not affect our 
‘most analogous guideline’ inquiry.” (citing Nichols, 169 F.3d at 
1270-76)).  It also bears repeating yet again that proof of 
physical injury is not necessary to trigger application of the 
assault guideline or for a simple assault conviction under federal 
law (and that these provisions likewise do not require use of a 
weapon).11 
                                              
 10 The District Court granted judgments of acquittal on 
charges of assault with a dangerous weapon with intent to do 
bodily harm and intentional assault resulting in serious bodily 
injury.  Defendants were not charged with simple assault under 
the federal assault provision.    
 
11 As we explain in Section III.B., we reject the notion 
that it would be improper to engage in the sort of fact-finding 
(under a preponderance of the evidence standard) that is 
necessary to calculate the advisory Guidelines range once an 
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 The District Court (as well as Carolyn) have devoted a 
great deal of attention to the nature of what is an admittedly 
complicated state statutory scheme.  Specifically, § 2C:24-4a 
incorporates definitions from Title 9 of the New Jersey Statutes 
Annotated (“Children—Juvenile and Domestic Relations 
Courts”).  According to Carolyn, Title 9—which has no federal 
analog—implicates the state’s unique parens patrie 
responsibility to protect children, the parent-child relationship, 
and a parent’s right to use reasonable discipline (as opposed to 
unnecessarily severe corporal punishment or unnecessary pain or 
suffering).  The District Court observed that Title 9 “is there to 
protect the children” and to provide a constitutionally 
appropriate mechanism for state family court judges to decide 
whether these children should be taken from their parents, 
whether they should eventually be reunified, and whether the 
parental relationship should be terminated: 
 
 And this is all very serious.  And this is all 
procedurally taken care of.  And this is all about 
what Title 9 does for the citizens of New Jersey.  
And why?  Because of what the courts have in the 
State of New Jersey, not in the federal 
government, when is parens patrie jurisdiction.  
We don’t talk about it.  No one’s briefed it for me. 
 Maybe you all know I know it. 
 
 But, I exercised parens patrie jurisdiction 
                                                                                                     
offense guideline is identified.  In Section III.C., we consider 
whether application of the Guidelines would be consistent with 
the ACA’s “like punishment” requirement. 
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as a family court judge and any of you who have 
had a family court matter in the State of New 
Jersey, including custody matters, private 
litigation, divorce custody, adoption, you all know 
that it’s the parens patrie jurisdiction of the family 
part.  And sometimes well, it’s part of Chancery. 
 
 That gives the authority to the judge to 
say what time you have to pick up your kids, to 
say where your child lives, to be as intrusive as 
one needs to be to protect the interests of the 
children, to move property around, to seize 
property if, in fact, somebody is trying to divest 
because it could hurt the family’s interest, to 
pass property through probate.  All of this has to 
do with the parens patrie jurisdiction if the 
interests of a child are involved. 
 
 So, is that federal?  Does the federal 
government have anything to say where that’s 
concerned?  I really do not believe it does.  And 
if somebody wants to make an argument, I will 
give you time to do it.  But, I’m saying it would 
be a strained and difficult argument to make as 
some of the enhancements were. 
 
 Let the State of New Jersey have its 
parens patrie jurisdiction.  And let us honor and 
respect it by seeing what we can do with this 
statute that incorporates that parens patrie 
jurisdiction in the rubric and the meaning of the 
definitions and the state crime that we are trying 
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to move because it arises out of the parens 
patrie jurisdiction. 
 
(A6581-A6582.)  In short, “this statute doesn’t really fit with 
assault because it is balancing the rights of parents to discipline 
their kids with the outcome of the execution of that right to 
discipline their kids.”  (A6583.)  The District Court believed that 
it simply could not fit a proverbial square peg into a round hole: 
 
 So, this case is about parental discipline, 
the choices of discipline and the findings of the 
jury that the choices of discipline, as identified in 
the various counts, amounted to either acts of 
cruelty as defined to them in the jury charge, or 
neglect that caused harm.   
 
 So, I don’t find an analogous federal 
statute.  I don’t find that the federal government’s 
laws about assault cover that parental relationship 
or custodial or legal guardian or authority over 
relationship that infuses and is the basis and is the 
reason for the state’s statute.  I find that this is 
fitting a square peg into a round hole. 
 
(A6588.) 
   
 “In Osborne, [the Eighth Circuit] commented that 
attempting to fashion a sentence pursuant to USSG § 2X5.1 is 
frequently similar to attempting to determine which round hole 
best accommodates a square peg.”  Allard, 164 F.3d at 1150.  
Nevertheless, § 2X5.1 still requires the sentencing court to 
undertake this admittedly difficult task, and the District Court 
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committed reversible error by failing to comply with this 
obligation. 
    
 In any event, we find that these various observations 
about Title 9 and New Jersey’s parens patrie jurisdiction 
ultimately have little, if any, real bearing on the outcome of the 
“sufficiently analogous” guideline inquiry.  As we have already 
explained, it is reasonable to expect that the offense of 
conviction may include an additional element missing from, or 
incorporate a more expansive element than, the federal offense.  
Based on the jury instructions given in this case, a jury finding 
that a defendant exceeded his or her parental rights by, for 
example, inflicting unnecessarily severe corporal punishment 
constituted an implicit finding that defendant thereby committed 
simple assault.  Furthermore, the District Court’s discussion of 
Title 9 and New Jersey family court proceedings appeared rather 
removed from the “elements-based” inquiry—an approach that 
Defendants themselves ask us to adopt.  By indicating that the 
“federal government does [not] have anything to say” here 
(A6582), the District Court also effectively called into question 
whether the child endangerment offense was properly 
assimilated under the ACA in the first place.  However, it is 
undisputed that the New Jersey Legislature, by enacting § 
2C:24-4a, decided that any person having a legal duty for the 
care of a child or who has assumed responsibility for the care of 
a child who causes the child harm that would make the child an 
abused or neglected child is guilty of a crime of the second 
degree.  In turn, the offenses at issue here—because they 
occurred on a military installation under the special jurisdiction 
of the federal government—were assimilated under the ACA.  
Even though the state criminal provision implicates the state’s 
interest in protecting children from harm while preserving the 
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parent-child relationship (and incorporates aspects of the state’s 
“Children-Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts” scheme), 
this is still a criminal prosecution in federal court under an 
assimilated state criminal statutory provision—and not, to give 
just one example, an action before a state family judge to 
terminate Defendants’ parental rights.  In fact, a separate 
Chancery Division proceeding was filed by the appropriate New 
Jersey authorities, which has resulted in the termination of 
Defendants’ parental rights vis-à-vis both J and C.12  See, e.g., 
C.J., 2014 WL 388131, at *39-*52. 
    
 Finally, we believe that the existing case law indicates 
that the assault guideline is “sufficiently analogous” to 
Defendants’ offenses of conviction.  
                                              
 12 Title 9 also incorporates criminal provisions.  See, e.g., 
§ 9:6-3 (“crime of fourth degree”).  We further note that Title 9 
does not merely apply to parents or legal guardians.  Section 
9:6-8.21a specifies that “[p]arent or guardian” includes, inter 
alia, “a teacher, employee, or volunteer” of an institution who is 
responsible for the child’s welfare, any other staff person 
regardless of whether he or she is responsible for the care or 
supervision of the child, and a teaching staff member or other 
employee of a day school.  In this case, the jury was instructed 
that “[a] person who has assumed responsibility for the care of a 
child includes any person who assumes a general and ongoing 
responsibility for the care of the child and who establishes a 
continuing or regular supervisory or caretaker relationship with 
the child.”  (A6012.)  Section 2C:24-4a also provides that “any 
other person” who engages in conduct or who causes harm as 
described in this paragraph to the child is guilty of a crime of the 
third degree. 
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 After all, the threshold “sufficiently analogous” guideline 
inquiry is satisfied merely if the analogous provisions are, inter 
alia, “within the ballpark,” Rakes, 510 F.3d at 1287, or “some 
plausible analog[y]” exists between the elements of the 
defendant’s crime and the elements of federal offenses covered 
by the existing offense guideline, id. at 1288.  The Sentencing 
Commission also indicates that most assimilated offenses will 
have a “sufficiently analogous” offense guideline.  See § 2X5.1 
cmt. background (“Nonetheless, the specific guidelines that have 
been promulgated cover the type of criminal behavior that most 
such offenses proscribe.”).  Concluding that the ACA did not 
assimilate a state first-degree murder child victim provision, the 
Supreme Court reserved judgment on the question of whether 
state child abuse statutes may be assimilated given the existence 
of a federal assault statute:  “And, without expressing any view 
on the merits of lower court cases that have assimilated state 
child abuse statutes despite the presence of a federal assault law, 
§ 113, see, e.g., United States v. Brown, [608 F.2d 551, 553-54 
(5th Cir. 1979)]; United States v. Fesler, 781 F.2d 384, 390-391 
(C.A.5 1986), we note that the federal assault prohibition is less 
comprehensive than the federal murder statute, and the relevant 
statutory relationships are less direct than those at issue here.”  
Lewis, 523 U.S. at 171-72. 
   
 In a companion case to its Osborne decision, the Eighth 
Circuit determined that the involuntary manslaughter guideline 
was “sufficiently analogous” to the assimilated state offense of 
vehicular battery—even though involuntary manslaughter 
requires the death of the victim while the battery charge only 
requires serious bodily injury.  Allard, 164 F.3d at 1149.  
Pointing out that analogous guidelines, by definition, do not and 
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need not perfectly match the defendant’s crime, the Allard court 
“cannot say as a matter of law that the difference between death 
and serious bodily injury makes involuntary manslaughter 
insufficiently analogous to vehicular battery.”  Id. (observing 
that necessary line drawing in determining whether victim’s 
injury is serious enough is better left to district court to decide as 
part of “most analogous” guideline analysis); see also, e.g., 
Calbat, 266 F.3d at 363-64 (rejecting defendant’s argument that 
involuntary manslaughter guideline was “most analogous” 
offense guideline to offense of intoxication assault); Osborne, 
164 F.3d at 440 (“As for Osborne’s argument that involuntary 
manslaughter is more analogous to vehicular battery, we first 
observe that death did not result in this case.  More importantly, 
we give due deference to the district court’s choice of the most 
analogous guideline and cannot say the aggravated assault 
guideline was inappropriately applied in this case.”).  Yet, if a 
homicide guideline could be considered to be “sufficiently 
analogous” to an offense that does not even require proof of 
death, we see no reason why the assault guideline should not 
apply here.13 
   
B. Refusal to Find Facts 
                                              
 13 According to Carolyn, any error was harmless.  
Nevertheless, Carolyn’s burden to establish harmless error is a 
heavy one, and it is one that she clearly does not meet here. See, 
e.g., United States v. Zabielski, 711 F.3d 381, 387 (3d Cir. 
2013) (noting that burden is very difficult to satisfy absent clear 
statement by district court that same sentence would have been 
imposed); United States v. Wright, 642 F.3d 148, 154 n.6 (3d 
Cir. 2011) (stating that error is not harmless unless alternative 
sentence was product of three-step Booker sentencing process). 
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 The District Court committed reversible error by refusing 
to engage in the requisite fact-finding pursuant to the applicable 
preponderance of the evidence standard.  
  
 It is well established that “the constitutional rights to a 
jury trial and proof beyond a reasonable doubt attach only to 
facts that ‘constitut[e] the elements of a crime,’ which are those 
facts that increase the maximum [or minimum] statutory 
punishment to which the defendant is exposed.”  United States 
v. Smith, 751 F.3d 107, 117 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Grier, 475 
F.3d at 562).  In contrast, “facts that only enhance sentences 
within the range allowed by the jury’s verdict (or guilty plea) 
need not be charged in an indictment or proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt.”  United States v. Tidwell, 521 F.3d 236, 250 
n.9 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Grier); see also, e.g., Smith, 751 F.3d 
at 117 (“Facts relevant to the application of various Guidelines 
provisions, which are advisory only, do not implicate these 
rights.”  (citing Grier, 475 F.3d at 562)).  As we have already 
explained, Defendants were charged, convicted, and should be 
sentenced for child endangerment (and conspiracy to commit 
child endangerment).  By finding Defendants guilty of crimes of 
the second degree, the jury triggered a maximum sentence for 
each count of conviction of ten years’ imprisonment (together 
with a minimum term of imprisonment of five years).  See N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2C:43-6a(2).  New Jersey law permits consecutive 
sentencing, meaning that the absolute maximum term of 
imprisonment at issue here is 120 years for Carolyn and 100 
years for John.  See, e.g. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:44-5.  Facts like 
the severity of the injury or the use of a weapon do not affect the 
maximum and minimum sentences established by statute.  In 
fact, neither the degree of harm suffered by the victim nor the 
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use of a weapon constitute an element of the offenses of 
conviction—or the federal crime of simple assault.  While 
“Booker afforded judges broad discretion to enter appropriate 
sentences in consideration of § 3553(a) factors,” it “is not within 
the sentencing judge’s discretion to diverge from applying the 
preponderance-of-the-evidence standard in the initial sentencing 
calculation at step one [i.e., calculation of the advisory 
Guidelines range.]”  United States v. Ali, 508 F.3d 136, 155 (3d 
Cir. 2007) (footnote omitted).  Likewise, a sentencing court 
cannot refuse to apply the Guidelines and calculate an advisory 
sentencing range because of its disagreement with otherwise 
applicable Guidelines.  See, e.g., Napolitan, 762 F.3d at 312-13; 
Gonzalez, 462 F.3d at 755. 
  
 Having identified the offense guideline applicable to the 
offense of conviction under the Guidelines, the sentencing court 
must then “determine the applicable guideline range in 
accordance with § 1B1.3 (Relevant Conduct).”  U.S.S.G. § 
1B1.2(b); see also, e.g., U.S.S.G. § 1B1.1(2) (directing court to 
determine base offense level and apply any appropriate specific 
offense characteristics, cross-references, and special instructions 
contained in applicable offense guideline).  As John explains, 
“[i]f a guideline is applicable, the second step involves applying 
enhancements and adjustments based on, inter alia, relevant 
conduct.”  (John’s Brief at 14 (citing § 1B1.2(b)).)  In other 
words, the court must “apply ‘any applicable specific offense 
characteristics (under that guideline), and any other applicable 
sentencing factors pursuant to the relevant conduct definition in 
§ 1B1.3.’”  (Id. at 16 (quoting U.S.S.G. § 1B1.2(b) cmt. n.2).)  
Unlike the “offense of conviction,” “‘Relevant Conduct’ 
includes other, uncharged and related activities.”  United States 
v. Pressler, 256 F.3d 144, 157 n.7 (3d Cir. 2001).  This includes 
 
 53 
facts that might have formed the basis of uncharged offenses as 
well as charges on which the defendant was acquitted.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Ciavarella, 716 F.3d 705, 735-36 (3d Cir. 2013) 
(“But ‘a jury’s verdict of acquittal does not prevent the 
sentencing court from considering conduct underlying the 
acquitted charge so long as that conduct has been proved by a 
preponderance of the evidence.’” (quoting United States v. 
Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997))); Grier, 475 F.3d at 568 
(“[Facts relevant to the application of the Guidelines—whether 
or not they constitute a separate offense] do not constitute 
‘elements’ of a ‘crime’ under the rationale of Apprendi and do 
not implicate the rights to a jury trial and proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt.” (quoting Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 
466, 490 (2000))).  But see United States v. Berry, 553 F.3d 273, 
281 n.6 (3d Cir. 2009) (questioning whether Watts is in tension 
with Apprendi line of cases).  In this case, the assault 
guideline’s cross-reference directs the sentencing court to apply 
the aggravated assault guideline “[i]f the conduct constituted 
aggravated assault.”  U.S.S.G. § 2A2.3(c).  In turn, the 
Guidelines set forth various enhancements for, inter alia, the 
level of planning, the degree of injury, the victim’s vulnerability, 
the use of dangerous weapons, the defendant’s abuse of trust, 
and obstruction of justice.  See U.S.S.G. §§ 2A2.2(b), 2A2.3(b), 
3A1.1(b)(1), 3B1.3, 3C1.1. 
       
 The District Court committed reversible error by refusing 
to make the requisite findings of fact with respect to both the 
advisory Guidelines calculation as well as the application of the 
§ 3553(a) factors.  Refusing to find aggravating facts under the 
applicable preponderance standard, it repeatedly indicated that it 
would not make any factual findings that were not necessarily 
found by the jury, or “‘shown beyond a reasonable doubt” 
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(A6701; see also A6578, 6715).  In particular, the District Court 
(having determined that there is no “sufficiently analogous” 
offense guideline) failed to make findings of fact relevant to the 
various sentencing enhancements as well as the assault 
guideline’s cross-reference to the offense guideline for 
aggravated assault.  John acknowledges that, if we conclude that 
there is a “sufficiently analogous” offense guideline, we “should 
remand the case to permit the [District Court] to calculate the 
guidelines range.”  (John’s Brief at 30.)  Because we conclude 
that the assault guideline constitutes a “sufficiently analogous” 
offense guideline, the District Court must now make the 
requisite findings of fact (under a preponderance of the evidence 
standard) in order to calculate this range (which includes 
deciding whether the aggravated assault guideline applies 
pursuant to the cross-reference as well as applying any relevant 
sentencing enhancements). 
     
C. The ACA, Sentencing Guidelines, and State Law 
 
 We agree with the government that—while, “following 
Booker, a sentencing court likely can consider what a state 
defendant would receive if he had been prosecuted in state 
court” (Appellant’s Brief at 52)—the District Court simply 
went too far in this case by focusing on state sentencing 
practices to the exclusion of basic federal sentencing 
principles.  Instead of acting as a federal court applying the 
well-established federal sentencing scheme, the District Court 
essentially acted as a state court applying the various intricate 
aspects of New Jersey’s sentencing practices. 
          
 18 U.S.C. § 13(a) subjects the defendant to “a like 
punishment.”  It is undisputed that state law thereby sets the 
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minimum and maximum punishment that may be imposed.  
Defendants do not claim that the Guidelines-based sentences 
sought by the government exceed this limitation. 
   
 Carolyn discusses New Jersey sentencing principles at 
some length.  She contends that the District Court “recognized 
that, in order to give effect to the fundamental principle of the 
ACA that a crime under that statute is ‘punishable only in the 
way and to the extent that it would have been punishable’ if 
committed on non-federal property, it was necessary to consider 
the actual time that the defendant will serve.”  (Carolyn’s Brief 
at 14-15 (quoting United States v. Press Publ’g Co., 219 U.S. 1, 
10 (1911) (emphasis added)).)  According to Carolyn, the 
District Court appropriately recognized that application of the 
Guidelines would not satisfy the ACA’s “like punishment” 
requirement.  According to the New Jersey Appellate Division, 
“‘the basic sentencing issue is always the real time defendant 
must serve, and we have always recognized that real time is the 
realistic and practical measure of the punishment imposed.’”  
State v. Cooper, 952 A.2d 1122, 1126 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2008) (citation omitted).  “The ‘real sentence’ is found in the 
State Parole Board Eligibility Tables which provide ‘a fair and 
practical indicator of the likely actual custodial time for those 
defendants who get full credit for good time, work time, and 
minimum custody time.’”  (Carolyn’s Brief at 15 (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Pressler & Veniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, 
Comment R. 3:21-4[10] (Gann 2017)).)  Carolyn explains that a 
defendant sentenced to a five-year term of imprisonment under 
New Jersey law would actually serve approximately 12 months 
(while, if he or she was sentenced to the same term under federal 
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law, the defendant would serve approximately 53 months).14  In 
addition, the state trial court may sentence a defendant to a term 
appropriate to a crime one degree lower if it is clearly convinced 
that the mitigating factors substantially outweigh the 
aggravating factors and the interest of justice so demand (which 
in this case would result in a term of between three and five 
years).  N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2C:43-6a(3), 2C:44-1f(2).  Similarly, 
there is a presumption of imprisonment for a person convicted 
of a second degree offense, but it may be overcome when the 
state sentencing judge finds imprisonment would constitute a 
serious injustice overriding the need to deter others.  N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:44-1d.  While acknowledging that a federal court 
need not follow every last nuance of state sentencing practices, 
Carolyn argues that Judge Hayden (a former state court judge) 
properly attempted to replicate a “real time” sentence. 
   
 However, Congress made it clear in 1990 that ACA 
defendants “shall be sentenced in accordance” with § 3553 and 
the Guidelines.  See Pub. L. No. 101-647, § 1602, 104 Stat. 478 
(1990).  We have explained that “state law sets the minimum 
and maximum punishment while the federal sentencing 
guidelines should be used to determine the actual sentence 
                                              
 14 Likewise, Carolyn argues that a defendant sentenced 
under New Jersey law to ten years’ imprisonment would have a 
“real time” sentence of around 23 months.  “Looked at another 
way, the 19 ½ years [for Carolyn] sought by the government 
exceeds the length of time a person would serve on a 70-year 
sentence.”  (Carolyn’s Brief at 59 (footnote omitted).)  Carolyn 
further claims that the maximum parole eligibility time for a 
defendant sentenced to a seven-year term of imprisonment is 
approximately 21 months. 
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within that range.”  See, e.g., United States v. Queensborough, 
227 F.3d 149, 160 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing United States v. Pierce, 
75 F.3d 173, 176 (4th Cir. 1996); United States v. Marmolejo, 
915 F.2d 981, 984 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. Garcia, 893 
F.2d 250, 254 (10th Cir. 1989)), abrogation on other grounds 
recognized by United States v. Dahmen, 675 F.3d 244 (3d Cir. 
2012).  In addition, § 3553(a)(6) directs district courts to 
consider the need to avoid unwarranted federal sentencing 
disparities.  See, e.g., United States v. Begin, 696 F.3d 405, 412-
14 (3d Cir. 2012).  The ACA does not assimilate a state 
sentencing policy or practice that conflicts with federal 
sentencing policies.  See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 38 
F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 1994) (“Coleman argues that with good 
time under Illinois law he would have had to serve a maximum 
of 7 ½ years (1/2 of the maximum 15 year penalty allowed).  
However, while the Assimilative Crimes Act states that 
punishment should be ‘like’ that of the state punishment, the 
federal government does not have to adopt the same provisions 
for computing when a sentence is satisfied.” (citing United 
States v. Norquay, 905 F.2d 1157, 1162 (8th Cir. 1990); United 
States v. Vaughan, 682 F.2d 290, 294-95 (2d Cir. 1982))); 
Norquay, 905 F.2d at 1163 (“We are similarly persuaded that 
application of state law regarding good time credits and 
consecutive versus concurrent sentencing to a federal offender 
under the Major Crimes Act would be disruptive to the federal 
prison system.”); United States v. Smith, 574 F.2d 988, 992 (9th 
Cir. 1978) (rejecting district court’s application of three-year 
minimum term under state law before prisoner could be eligible 
for parole because ACA “does not further require adherence to 
state policy with reference to parole eligibility,” prisoner is 
federal prisoner subject to federal correctional policies, and it 
would be disruptive to have two classes of prisoners subject to 
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different rules).15   
 
 According to Carolyn, “[f]ederal parole policy is not 
implicated here, and it is not contended that New Jersey parole 
policy should be adopted by the federal prison system.”  
(Carolyn’s Brief at 47.)  But insofar as Carolyn and the District 
Court have indicated that the concept of “real time”—i.e., the 
parole eligibility date under state law—should control, this is 
what in essence occurred here.  After all, there is no real 
difference between a sentencing court directing the Bureau of 
Prisons to apply state parole policies and a court simply 
adopting these policies from the outset by imposing a term of 
imprisonment based on the putative date that the defendant 
would be eligible for release if prosecuted, convicted, and 
sentenced in the state court system. 
  
                                              
 15 Asserting that the ACA “represents a deliberate choice 
to promote intrastate uniformity above interstate uniformity 
when a defendant commits a crime, otherwise punishable by 
state law, on federal land,” the Fifth Circuit determined that 
Texas law requiring concurrent sentences must be honored.  
United States v. Martinez, 274 F.3d 897, 908 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(citing Garcia, 893 F.2d at 253-54).  However, Martinez 
addressed the maximum sentence allowed under state law (as 
opposed to anything resembling New Jersey’s “real time” 
concept).  Id. at 909 (“Texas’s choice to limit the length of all 
concurrent sentences deserves as much deference as does a 
choice to set the statutory maximum for an individual crime.” 
(footnote omitted)).  We also note that the Eighth Circuit refused 
to apply state law governing concurrent and consecutive 
sentences.  Norquay, 905 F.3d at 1163.       
 
 
 59 
D. Substantive Unreasonableness16 
 
 Finally, we consider the substantive reasonableness of the 
sentences imposed by the District Court.  According to the 
government, “no reasonable sentencing court would have 
imposed such lenient sentences on parents who beat, starved, 
and neglected their young and defenseless adopted children over 
a five-year period, contributing to the death of one, almost 
killing another twice, and causing permanent damage to the 
survivors.”  (Appellant’s Brief at 54 (emphasis omitted).)  The 
government may go too far in its characterization of Defendants’ 
conduct and the injuries they inflicted on their children.  In 
addition, we do not suggest that the District Court must sentence 
Defendants to the terms of imprisonment sought by the 
government (235 months for Carolyn and 188 months for John). 
 Nevertheless, we do conclude that “no reasonable sentencing 
court would have imposed [a sentence of 24 months’ 
imprisonment and three years of supervised release for Carolyn 
and a sentence of two years of probation, a fine, and community 
service for John] for the reasons the district court provided.”  
Tomko, 562 F.3d at 568.  Simply put, more than two years of 
incarceration and probation is required to satisfy the purposes of 
sentencing established by Congress.    
    
 The third step of the three-step sentencing process 
requires the district court to exercise its discretion by 
considering the relevant § 3553(a) sentencing factors.  See, e.g., 
                                              
 16 Upon finding these procedural errors in the sentences, 
Judge Fuentes would vacate and remand for resentencing 
without reaching the substantive unreasonableness of the 
sentences. 
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id. at 567.  These factors are: 
  
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense 
and the history and characteristics of the 
defendant; 
 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 
 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the 
offense, to promote respect for the law, 
and to provide just punishment for the 
offense; 
 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to 
criminal conduct; 
  
(C) to protect the public from further 
crimes of the defendant; and 
 
(D) to provide the defendant with needed 
educational or vocational training, medical 
care, or other correctional treatment in the 
most effective manner; 
 
(3) the kinds of sentences available; 
 
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range 
established for— 
 
(A) the applicable category of offense 
committed by the applicable category of 
defendant as set forth in the guidelines . . . 
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.; 
 
(5) any pertinent policy statement— 
 
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission . 
. . .; 
 
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence 
disparities among defendants with similar records 
who have been found guilty of similar conduct; 
and  
 
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims 
of the offense. 
 
§ 3553(a).  Under this statutory provision, the court must impose 
a sentence that is “sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to 
comply with the purposes of [sentencing].”  Id.  “This 
requirement is often referred to as ‘the parsimony provision,’ 
and the Supreme Court has referred to it as the ‘overarching 
instruction’ of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).”  United States v. Olhovsky, 
562 F.3d 530, 548-49 (3d Cir. 2009) (quoting Kimbrough v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 85, 101 (2007)).  It is well established 
that the sentencing judge occupies a “‘superior position to find 
facts and judge their import under § 3553(a) in the individual 
case,’” and “‘gain[ ] insights not conveyed by the record.’”  
Tomko, 562 F.3d at 560-61 (quoting Gall v. United States, 552 
U.S. 38, 51-52 (2007)).  However, this does not make us a mere 
rubber stamp.  A sentence must still be reversed if “no 
reasonable sentencing court would have imposed the same 
sentence on that particular defendant for the reasons the district 
court provided.”  Id. at 568.  This standard is “not an exercise in 
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[appellate] self-abnegation.”  Id. at 575. 
 
 Our preferred course of action upon finding procedural 
error is to remand the case for resentencing, without considering 
the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed.  See, 
e.g., United States v. Merced, 603 F.3d 203, 214 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 Nevertheless, “procedural problems may lead to substantive 
problems, so there are times when a discussion of procedural 
error will necessarily raise questions about the substantive 
reasonableness of a sentence.”  United States v. Levinson, 543 
F.3d 190, 195 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing United States v. Goff, 501 
F.3d 250, 256 (3d Cir. 2007)).  This is one of those times.  
  
 The government asserts that proper consideration of the 
facts and the relevant Guidelines would have resulted in a 
sentencing range for Defendants of 210 to 262 months 
(according to the Probation Office) or 292 to 365 months (as 
calculated by the government).  See, e.g., § 3553(a)(4)(A) 
(referring to sentencing range for “the applicable category of 
offense committed by the applicable category of defendant as set 
forth in the guidelines”).  While the District Court never 
undertook the proper Guidelines calculation, it appears 
undisputed that the advisory range under the Guidelines would 
have been substantially higher than the sentences that were 
imposed here.  In essence, probation for John and 24 months’ 
imprisonment for Carolyn represented enormous downward 
variances, which require correspondingly robust explanations 
for why such lenience was warranted.  See, e.g., Gall, 552 U.S. 
at 50 (“We find it uncontroversial that a major departure should 
be supported by a more significant justification than a minor 
one.”); Merced, 603 F.3d at 216 (“The extent of the explanation 
we require [to allow us to conduct the substantive 
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reasonableness review] may turn on whether the court has varied 
from the Guidelines range, and, if it has, on the magnitude of the 
variance.”).  The District Court, however, clearly did not 
provide the requisite explanation for such lenient sentences. 
   
  Characterizing Defendants’ conduct as misguided 
corporal punishment and mistaken or bad parenting, the District 
Court refused to hold Defendants’ responsible for the children’s 
various injuries and medical conditions.  Relying on the parties’ 
jury instruction dispute (addressed in Section III.A., supra), it 
claimed that “[t]he government rejected a jury charge that would 
define an abused or neglected child as suffering the degree of 
harm that its arguing I should say happened and that the child 
did suffer.”  (A6576.)  According to the District Court, this case 
implicated “a very naked verdict sheet,” in which the jury failed 
to indicate “what they were particularly offended by, how the 
acts linked up with a particular medical condition of the 
children.”  (A6690.)  “I have to cope with the fact, everybody 
has to cope with the fact that the live doctors who touched these 
children during the time that the children were in their care, up 
to the time in May 2010, or actually I believe it was April 2010 
the child was brought to the hospital, these doctors did not find 
what the government is saying was going on, which is a 
systematic torture resulting in terrible injuries to vulnerable 
children.”  (A6691.)  The District Court wished that it knew 
what the jury found, but all it had were findings that Defendants 
committed acts of cruelty and neglect that caused harm:  “I don’t 
know the extent of harm.  And I don’t know whether the jury 
bought that all of these physical conditions that were explained 
to the satisfaction of medical doctors at the time the children 
were examined, up until April of 2010, I don’t know that the 
jury found that they are the result of massive, horrible, criminal, 
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sadistic abuse as a result of a five-year conspiracy to do that.”  
(A6700-A6701.) 
   
 However, “a guilty verdict, not set aside, binds the 
sentencing court to accept the facts necessarily implicit in the 
verdict.”  United States v. Boggi, 74 F.3d 470, 478-79 (3d Cir. 
1996) (quoting United States v. Weston, 960 F.2d 212, 218 (1st 
Cir. 1992).  We agree with the government that the District 
Court in this case effectively “substitut[ed] its view of the 
evidence . . . for the jury’s verdict.”  United States v. Bertling, 
611 F.3d 477, 481 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. 
Rivera, 411 F.3d 864, 866 (7th Cir. 2005)).     
  
 The government admittedly does read too much into the 
jury’s verdict.  Specifically, the jury never explicitly found that 
Defendants “‘torture[d]’ three young adopted children over a 
five-year period.”  (Appellant’s Brief at 1 (quoting A6360).)  
The indictment did not charge Defendants with “torture,” and 
the jury was never instructed that they had to find that 
Defendants “tortured” the children.  Given the expansive nature 
of the child endangerment instructions as well as the allegations 
against Defendants (involving numerous acts of abuse 
committed over the course of a five-year conspiracy), we 
recognize the difficulty in connecting each count with a specific 
incident or a particular injury or condition.   
 
 Nevertheless, the jury did find Defendants guilty of 
conspiracy to endanger the welfare of a child.  Carolyn was 
found guilty on eleven counts of child endangerment while John 
was convicted on nine such counts.  The jury was instructed that 
“cruelty” consists of either—(a) inflicting unnecessarily severe 
corporal punishment, (b) inflicting upon a child unnecessary 
 
 65 
suffering or pain, either mental or physical, or habitually 
tormenting, vexing or afflicting a child, (c) any act of omission 
or commission whereby unnecessary pain and suffering 
(whether mental or physical) is caused or permitted to be 
inflicted on a child; or (d) exposing a child to unnecessary 
hardship, fatigue, or mental or physical strains that may tend to 
injure the health or physical well-being of the child.  The 
District Court defined “neglect” as failing to provide proper and 
sufficient food, clothing, maintenance, medical attendance, or 
surgical treatment, or the failure to do or permit to be done any 
act necessary for the child’s physical well-being.  The 
government also established beyond a reasonable doubt that 
Defendants knew their conduct would cause the harm or would 
inflict cruelty.  The jury was even specifically instructed on both 
the permissible use of corporal punishment and a “Good Faith 
Defense”—and yet it still returned guilty verdicts on multiple 
counts against Defendants. 
 
 While the parties may contest causation, the children 
clearly suffered various injuries and had a number of serious 
medical conditions.  Joshua had a life-threatening bile duct 
perforation, a serious brain injury, a fractured skull, a fractured 
right arm, a spinal problem, and a gangrenous finger that 
required partial amputation.  He also was admitted to the 
hospital with an extensive case of scalded skin syndrome, a skin 
condition that causes skin to peel off.  J had bruises on her body, 
and C’s body was covered with marks, scars, and lesions.  C was 
hospitalized in January 2010 with hypernatremia, i.e., high 
sodium levels and dehydration.  Normal sodium levels are 
generally between 133 to 143, and 10 points above normal 
levels is considered dangerous.  C’s sodium level (181) was so 
high that her doctor “was surprised she was still alive and 
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functioning in the emergency department.”  (A922-A923.)  She 
was again hospitalized in April 2010 for the same condition.  
This time her sodium level (195) was “[r]are for any living 
person” (A572) and was “at the margins of what you can 
survive” (A3405).  Furthermore, evidence was introduced 
indicating that C’s arm was fractured.  The children, especially 
Joshua and C, did not really grow (and even regressed) during 
their time with Defendants.  For example, Joshua weighed less 
than he did at 11 months just three weeks before his third 
birthday.  He weighed, at the age of two years and 11 months, 
“as much as a baby that is less than one year old.”  (A4275.)  At 
the age of approximately one year and 10 months, C weighed 
the same as the average 4 ½-month-old baby and less than she 
had weighed at nine months.  Following their removal from 
Defendants’ custody, J and C grew quickly (with C doubling her 
weight in several months). 
 
 For each substantive count, the jury instructions reiterated 
the factual allegations set forth in the indictment.  The 
instruction for Count 2, for example, stated the following: 
 
Count Two alleges that from in or about March 
2006 through on or about May 8, 2008, within the 
special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the 
United States, at Picatinny Arsenal Installation, in 
Morris County, in the District of New Jersey, and 
elsewhere, the defendants, Carolyn Jackson and 
John E. Jackson, having a legal duty for the care 
of and having assumed responsibility for the care 
of Joshua Jackson, a/k/a “Joshua Kennedy, ” born 
 May 13, 2005, knowingly caused harm to Joshua 
by withholding sufficient nourishment and food 
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from him, and made Joshua a neglected child, and 
a child upon whom cruelty has been inflicted, as I 
have defined for you previously, in violation of 
Title 18, United States Code, Sections 13 and 2, 
and N.J.S.A. Section 2C:24-4a. 
 
(A6019.)  Likewise, the instruction for Count 7 stated that 
Defendants knowingly caused harm to C by withholding 
sufficient nourishment and food, and the instructions for Counts 
4 and 8 repeated the allegations that Defendants knowingly 
caused harm by withholding adequate water from J and C 
(respectively).  The Count 3, 6, and 12 instructions respectively 
stated that Defendants “knowingly caused harm to [Joshua, J, 
and C] by physically assaulting [Joshua, J, and C] with various 
objects and with their hands.”  (A6021, A6024, A6030.)  The 
jury was told that Counts 5 and 9 “alleges that” Defendants 
“knowingly caused harm to [J and C, respectively] by forcing 
[them] to ingest hot sauce, red pepper flakes, and raw onion” [in 
the case of J] (A6023) or “hot sauce and red peppers [in the case 
of C]” (A6027).  The instruction for Count 11 stated that 
Defendants “knowingly caused harm to [C] by withholding 
prompt and proper medical care for her dehydration and 
elevated sodium levels.”  (A6029.)  The Defendants’ verdict 
sheets similarly set forth these factual allegations under each 
respective count.  For instance, the form stated for Count 3:  
“(Endangering the Welfare of a Child:  Physically assaulting 
JOSHUA JACKSON with various objects and with their 
hands).”  (A6054, A6058.)  The District Court asked for the 
jury’s verdict using these basic allegations to identify each 
count.  For example, the jury foreperson was asked with respect 
to Carolyn:  “As to Count Two.  Endangering the Welfare of a 
Child:  Withholding sufficient nourishment and food from 
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Joshua Jackson?”  (A5963.)  The answer was, “Guilty.”  (Id.) 
   
 It defies common sense to believe that the jury found that 
Defendants physically assaulted their adopted children, withheld 
sufficient nourishment and water from them, and forced them to 
ingest hot sauce, red pepper flakes, and raw onion—but that 
such conduct did not cause the marks and bruises, the 
malnourishment, the hypernatremia, and the children’s other 
injuries and medical issues.  In fact, the instruction for Count 10 
was explicit on the question of causation: 
 
Count Ten alleges that from on or about April 10, 
2010 through on or about April 15, 2010, within 
the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of 
the United States, at Picatinny Arsenal 
Installation, in Morris County, in the District of 
New Jersey, and elsewhere, the defendants, 
Carolyn Jackson and John E. Jackson, having a 
legal duty for the care of and having assumed 
responsibility for the care of [C], born April 7, 
2008, knowingly caused harm to [C] by causing 
her to ingest excessive sodium and a sodium-
laden substance while restricting her fluid intake, 
causing [C] to suffer hypernatremia and 
dehydration, a life-threatening condition, and 
made [C] a neglected child, and a child upon 
whom cruelty has been inflicted, as I have defined 
for you previously, in violation of Title 18, United 
States Code Sections 13 and 2, and N.J.S.A. 
Section 2C:24-4a. 
 
(A6028.)  The jury returned a guilty verdict on this count as to 
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Carolyn.  
    
 Given these circumstances, the District Court committed 
reversible error by downplaying the severity of Defendants’ 
criminal misconduct.  According to John, “[t]he government 
incorrectly asserts that the court erroneously minimized the 
defendants’ conduct as ‘mistaken,’ ‘merely “foolish,”’, or ‘bad 
parenting.’”  (John’s Brief at 46 (quoting Appellant’s Brief at 
57-59).)  “While the court indeed uttered these particular words 
during the over ten-hour sentencing hearing, they do not, 
individually or collectively, reflect the court’s view of the 
offenses as trivial.”  (Id.)  John goes on to claim that the District 
Court fully took into account his role in the offenses.  Although 
the District Court did acknowledge, for instance, that it was 
satisfied that Defendants committed a second degree offense and 
that the children suffered pain, its more dismissive sentiments 
cannot be set aside so easily.  After all, it did impose lenient 
sentences, while “reject[ing] many of the government’s claims 
regarding causation and degree of harm.”  (Id. at 9 (emphasis 
omitted).)  Carolyn herself continues to minimize the offenses 
she committed by indicating (like the District Court) that 
Defendants could have been charged with a crime of the fourth 
degree under Title 9.  
  
 While John was clearly less culpable than his wife and 
thereby deserved a shorter sentence than she should have 
received, the District Court unduly minimized his role here.  
Simply put, this was not a case in which (as the District Court 
put it) he merely “watched” and “tolerated” Carolyn’s conduct.  
(A6708.)  On the contrary, the jury found that John conspired—
i.e., agreed—with Carolyn to endanger the welfare of a child—
and that he was criminally liable for nine substantive child 
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endangerment counts.  In fact, he was found guilty of the same 
substantive offenses as Carolyn,17 with the exception of the 
charges for withholding sufficient nourishment and food from J 
and for causing C to ingest excessive sodium and a sodium-
laden substance while restricting C’s fluid intake.  
  
 Accordingly, the sentences imposed failed to “reflect the 
seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to 
provide just punishment for the offense”—as well as to account 
for the “nature and characteristics of the offense.”  Given the 
serious harm that the jury indicated Defendants inflicted on 
Joshua, J, and C, this was not a simple case of bad or misguided 
parenting.  Nevertheless, the District Court indicated that what 
Carolyn was attempting to do was actually brave:  “But, let’s not 
forget, five kids in the house, three of them being home 
schooled.  Stupid to think you could do it all.  If it had worked 
out, if it had worked out, it would have been called brave.  Just 
remember that everybody.  If it had worked out, that would have 
been called brave.”  (A6734.)  How is it “brave” to make a 
young girl ingest excessive sodium and then deny her adequate 
                                              
 17 The jury was charged on the theory of “Accomplice 
Liability; Aiding and Abetting (18 U.S.C. § 2(a)).”  (A6042 
(emphasis omitted).)  The District Court also explained that the 
jury could find Defendants guilty of the substantive offenses 
“based on the legal rule that each member of a conspiracy is 
responsible for crimes and other acts committed by the other 
members, as long as those crimes and acts were committed to 
help further or achieve the objective of the conspiracy and were 
reasonably foreseeable to Carolyn Jackson and John E. Jackson 
as a necessary or natural consequence of the agreement.”  
(A6039.) 
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medical care when this excessive sodium causes a life-
threatening medical condition?  While we do not suggest at this 
time that the District Court must accept the sentences proposed 
by the government, it was also inappropriate, especially in the 
light of the severity of the injuries inflicted in this case, to 
compare the government’s position to a football game: 
     
 Nineteen years for Carolyn Jackson for 
this?  Are you kidding me?  Fifteen years for Mr. 
Jackson for this?  Are you kidding me?  Why 
can’t people think clearly.  This is not a game.  
This is not the Giants versus Miami.  This is not 
how many touchdowns do we win by.  This is life. 
 And if you want the proportionality, I know they 
say the same offense.  We don’t have a same 
offense.  This is one of a kind.  Let’s hope the 
government is able to duck another one.  Let’s 
hope I am.  But, the bottom line is, this is serious, 
19 years and 15 years, give everybody a break and 
let’s get real. 
 
(A6729.)  Stating that society as a whole was not harmed by 
Defendants, the District Court observed that “[t]hey were not 
running around State lines, finding people, committing real 
federal offenses.  Real ones.”  (A6731.)  Even if the District 
Court was merely responding to a specific argument the 
government raised with respect to deterrence (i.e., that 
Defendants were a threat to their future grandchildren), it still 
minimized the seriousness of their conduct as compared with so-
called “real federal offenses.”   
 
    The District Court understandably took into account the 
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collateral consequences facing Defendants as a result of their 
convictions and underlying conduct.  Specifically, it noted that 
they lost custody of their biological children (a decision that was 
partially overturned on appeal), that lengthier sentences would 
further remove them from two of their biological children’s 
lives, and that they were now “dead” to their third biological 
child (JJ).  John also lost his military career and his pension—he 
was discharged from the United States Army under other than 
honorable conditions for unacceptable conduct.  Yet these 
consequences, which were the understandable results of their 
own criminal conduct, must be weighed against the harm they 
caused to the actual victims in this case.  If anything, the losses 
they have incurred demonstrate that this is not a case of 
disadvantaged individuals who may have believed they had no 
choice but to engage in criminal conduct.  Instead, Defendants 
were the well-educated and respected parents of several 
biological and adopted children, and John, in particular, was a 
career military officer with twenty-two years of service.  Yet 
they still endangered the welfare of their children despite their 
many advantages. 
 
 According to John, the government’s theory rests on the 
premise that probation is not punitive, and it ignores the $15,000 
fine and the requirement that John serve 400 hours of 
community service.  We do not dispute the punitive nature of 
probation or the relevance of the other components of John’s 
sentence.  Instead, we simply agree with the government that, 
under these specific circumstances, the District Court’s sentence 
of probation (and a fine and community service) did not really 
take account the seriousness of John’s offense, the need to 
promote respect for the law and to provide just punishment, and 
the nature and circumstances of the offense.  We further note 
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that, even under the state sentencing scheme, there is a 
presumption of imprisonment for second degree offenses, which 
is overcome only when the sentencing judge finds that 
imprisonment would constitute a serious injustice overriding the 
need to deter others.  See § 2C:44-1d. 
   
 Section 3553 also requires the sentencing court to 
consider the issue of deterrence.  The lenient sentences imposed 
here clearly failed to afford either specific or general deterrence. 
 The District Court stated that “everything that [John] lost is 
deterrence, both specific and general.”  (A6725.)  “And 
everything that the Army may want in terms of showing that it 
doesn’t like things like this going on at the base, you have 
somebody that high up who’s taken down, that all happened 
already.”  (Id.)  With respect to Carolyn, it indicated that her 
prison sentence would demonstrate that her conduct was 
intolerable.  However, it also observed that:  “I don’t need to be 
worried about doing something with the sentence to deter.  I 
really have a problem with saying under the ACA I have to be 
doing Army base cleanup.  That’s not what the sentence is 
about.  And I specifically reject that that should be a piece in 
terms of the deterrence.”  (A6726-A6727.)  With respect to the 
need for specific deterrence, we note that the criminal conduct 
involved conspiracy and various acts of neglect and cruelty 
committed over a period of time against three different victims.  
Cf., e.g., United States v. Kane, 639 F.3d 1121, 1131-32 (8th 
Cir. 2011) (“Far from demonstrating Kane posed no risk to 
recidivate, we observed, ‘The facts show Kane repeated her 
crime over and over again.  Instead of protecting her daughter 
and choosing to stop participating in her daughter’s abuse after 
the first, or 50th, or 150th molestation, Kane continued to hold 
her daughter down or block the door on more than 200 
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occasions while Champion sexually violated the child.’” 
(quoting United States v. Kane, 552 F.3d 748, 753 (8th Cir. 
2009))).  Especially given the District Court’s statement that, “if 
it had worked out, [the parenting] would have been called 
brave,” (A6734), the sentences “convey to Defendants (and 
others who may share their parenting ‘philosophy’) that their 
conduct might not have been so terrible after all.”  (Appellant’s 
Brief at 69 (citation omitted)).  
      
 Section 3553(a)(6) directs the sentencing court to 
consider “the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities 
among defendants with similar records who have been found 
guilty of similar conduct.”  According to the government, the 
District Court overlooked other federal child abuse cases by 
focusing on state sentencing policies and hypothetical state 
sentences.  According to John, most of the federal cases cited by 
the government are distinguishable (specifically all but one 
implicated federal murder charges).  The District Court also 
noted that the government “settled the case through a plea of 
somebody who was using a platform called KIK, had 600 phone 
calls to young girls, met 6 of them, had sex with them.”  
(A6728.)  The government was satisfied with a twenty-year 
sentence even though the conduct in that case was significantly 
more harmful than what occurred here.  But the government still 
sought “19 years [for Carolyn] and 15 years [for John].”  (Id.)  
Nevertheless, we question how this other case (in which the 
defendant pled guilty and still received a twenty-year sentence) 
justifies sentences of 24 months’ incarceration and probation.  
The District Court further referred to a New Jersey state court 
proceeding in which the defendant was sentenced to probation 
where a hypernatremia episode resulted in permanent brain 
damage.  However, one of the federal cases cited by the 
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government “involved a prosecution for a state offense under 
the ACA, i.e., willfully and maliciously engaging in child abuse 
under Oklahoma law” in which the defendant received a 
sentence of 144 months.  (John’s Brief at 40-41 (citing United 
States v. Hill, No. 5:11-cr-00152-F (W.D. Okla.).)  We have 
already observed that, while the District Court went too far by 
considering state sentencing practices to the exclusion of federal 
sentencing principles, a sentencing court “likely can consider 
what a state defendant would receive if he had been prosecuted 
in state court” (Appellant’s Brief at 52.)   Even so, there is still a 
presumption of imprisonment for offenses of the second degree 
under New Jersey law.  See § 2C:44-1d.  In addition, “crimes 
involving multiple victims represent an especially suitable 
circumstance for the imposition of consecutive sentences.”  
State v. Molina, 775 A.2d 509, 512 (N.J. 2001) (citing State v. 
Carey, 775 A.2d 495, 504 (N.J. 2001)); see also, e.g., N.J. Stat. 
Ann. § 2C:43-6b (authorizing sentencing court to impose 
periods of parole ineligibility where it is clearly convinced that 
aggravating factors substantially outweigh mitigating factors).  
In addition, the District Court should also consider on remand a 
recent state court disposition in which the judge “imposed a 25-
year sentence on a mother for the manslaughter of her daughter 
and two 10-year consecutive sentences for the endangerment of 
her other two children.”  (Appellant’s Reply Brief at 23 n.14 
(emphasis omitted) (citing State v. Rezireksyon, No. 11-003445 
(Essex County)).)    
        
 We also agree with the government that the sentences did 
not properly account for “the history and characteristics” of 
these two Defendants. 
    
 Admittedly, Defendants did express some remorse for 
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their actions, although at the same time they offered 
justifications for what they had done or focused on what they 
suffered as a result of their conduct.  Even the government 
acknowledges that “John ‘extend[ed] a sincere apology to all of 
my children.’”  (Appellant’s Brief at 72 (citing A6632-A6633).) 
 Yet he also claimed that “[w]ith all my heart I believed that I 
was rearing all of my children with lawful discipline.”  (A6633.) 
 In a written statement, Carolyn asserted that she was 
heartbroken over her mistakes as a parent.  While she claimed at 
the sentencing hearing that she took responsibility for her 
actions and “won’t make excuses” (A6630), she also stated that 
“I probably was not equipped to handle that responsibility” 
(A6629).  Carolyn, like the District Court, focused on what she 
had lost as a result of her own actions.  Asserting that “I would 
like to tell you that I directly feel like I have lost what’s most 
important to me, and that’s my family,” she explained that, “as 
[JJ] eloquently demonstrated this morning, he, [J] and [C] will 
never be a part of our family again.”  (A6630.)  While the 
District Court credited Defendants with how they conducted 
themselves during JJ’s testimony, Carolyn’s defense counsel 
vigorously attacked him and his credibility.  He was called a 
“liar” (A2173), a “habitual” liar (A5742), a “pathological” liar 
(A2486), a “disruptive” kid (A2246), and a “marionette” 
(A5744).  Character witnesses were called to attack his 
reputation.  See, e.g., Kane, 639 F.3d at 1136 (“Instead of 
accepting responsibility for her crimes, Kane challenged the 
truthfulness of her child’s testimony at trial, calling the child a 
liar, as the child mustered the courage to confront her abusers.”).  
 
 More importantly, the government appropriately takes 
issue with the emphasis that the District Court placed on John’s 
military record.  The District Court turned to a Sentencing 
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Commission policy statement stating that “[m]ilitary service 
may be relevant in determining whether a departure is 
warranted, if the military service, individually or in combination 
with other offender characteristics, is present to an unusual 
degree and distinguishes the case from the typical cases covered 
by the guidelines.”  U.S.S.G. § 5H1.11; see also, e.g., § 
3553(a)(5) (requiring court to consider “any pertinent policy 
statement”).  According to the District Court: 
 
 So, what stands out in the 3553 and 
3553(a) analysis is what role that military service 
should play.  The focal point of the defense’s 
argument, quite different argument than presented 
for Mrs. Jackson, it was something that totally 
guided the way the family lived.  But, apparently 
Mr. Jackson was a stellar soldier.  I don’t think 
we think enough about that, what that means in 
this day and age when somebody chooses to be a 
soldier.  And as this man did, chose when he was 
young and stuck it out and moved his family 
around and sought to excel and apparently was 
excelling. 
 
 I thought a troubling point came, Miss 
Jampol [an Assistant United States Attorney] kind 
of came close to it, Mr. Shumofsky [another 
federal prosecutor] came down on it with two feet 
when in his closing remarks to the jury, he said 
that to the extent that Mr. Jackson is characterized 
as not really being around for some of the abusive 
acts ascribed to both parties, there came a point 
when he was back from his tour in Iraq and he 
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didn’t have Iraq to hide behind anymore. 
   
 I don’t think that’s what military service is. 
 I don’t know if he would say that again.  Mr. 
Shumofsky, you argued very hard, and I admire 
your zeal, but Iraq is not something to hide 
behind.  Military service is something, frankly, to 
praise when it is pursued as Mr. Jackson did.  So, 
we have that. 
 
(A6705-A6706.)  The District Court “put [John] in a separate 
category” because of his military service: 
 
 History and characteristics of the 
defendant, we’ve talked about his military career. 
 And I put him in a separate category, rightly or 
wrongly, of citizens before this Court because of 
that military service.  Because of the times we are 
in when it is volunteer service.  Because of the 
quality of the service.  Because of the hardship of 
his family that was subjected to his military 
service.  Because of the risks that he took when he 
went abroad to fight.  Because he was in combat.  
I believe it was wrong to walk away from that.  So 
history and characteristics and of course an 
unblemished criminal record. 
 
(A6717.)  It also applied this line of reasoning to Carolyn.  “In 
recognizing whether I would give her prison time at all and 
recognizing when I say that Mr. Jackson is exceptional, she was 
exceptional too.  She was an Army wife.”  (A6732.) 
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 While it appears undisputed that military service can be 
taken into account in fashioning an appropriate sentence, the 
District Court went too far in this case.  In particular, it was 
improper to place members of the military (and their families) 
into “a separate category.”  We certainly do not question the 
great sacrifices made by men and women who volunteer to 
defend this country—as well as their families.  However, the 
military does not constitute some separate caste or class entitled 
to special rights or privileges not shared by other Americans.  
Even the policy guideline states that a departure may be 
appropriate where military service is present to an “unusual 
degree” and distinguishes the case from the typical cases 
covered by the Guidelines.  In turn, neither the District Court 
nor Carolyn herself cite to any case applying § 5H1.11 to 
military spouses or other family members.  John’s military 
service was also used as a defense at the trial itself, with the 
defense claiming that he did not know what was happening to 
the children because he was serving in Iraq.  In any event, his 
stellar and admirable record as a soldier did little, if anything, to 
mitigate the harm suffered by Joshua, J, and C. 
   
 In fact, it is undisputed that these crimes occurred despite 
the fact that John was a well-educated and respected member of 
the community who had obtained the rank of major in the 
United States Army.  Like her husband, Carolyn had a college 
education, and, having earned a degree in Individual and Family 
Studies, she even briefly worked as a teacher.  Both Defendants 
raised several biological children, and received training about 
parenting and child welfare in connection with the adoptions. 
       
 Finally, we are troubled by the particular emphasis that 
the District Court placed on Defendants’ appearance and 
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conduct in (and around) the courtroom.  It stated the following:  
  
 And I find too, and this is very important, 
not only have I have read all of this stuff, not only 
have I read stuff you haven’t seen, but, I’ve 
watched the Jacksons, many, many times come 
and go in this courthouse.  I have seen them in the 
corridors and I have seen other defendants.  I have 
seen how people come in dressed very sloppily, 
just lollygagging around in the pews, bringing in 
food, you brought it in today and just kind of 
treating this courtroom like a luncheonette. 
  
 That’s not the way the Jacksons have ever 
behaved.  They have had long car rides.  They are 
always on time.  Always on time.  They are 
interacting with the lawyers.  One of the things a 
Judge sees, I tell young lawyers this over and over 
again, we see how you interact with your clients.  
If you don’t like your clients or if your clients are 
real big swift pains in the neck, we see it.  You 
can’t hide it.  We see it. 
 
 I have seen nothing but respect between 
these people and their lawyers, and respect given 
to court personnel and to me.  You don’t just do 
that day after day for over two years, not 
everyday, but during the time these proceedings 
have lumbered through this courtroom, without 
saying something about your character.  And that 
is inconsistent with the kind of monstrosities that 
the government would suggest were committed 
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upon these little girls, and inconsistent with 
having the kind of vindictiveness against their son 
that is suggested. 
 
(A6722-A6723.)  Is it really appropriate to impose sentences of 
probation or two years of imprisonment because a defendant’s 
attorney did not exhibit any visible animosity to his or her own 
client in the courthouse?  Defendants’ disciplined attitude in the 
courthouse actually is not too surprising given the fact that John 
was an army officer (and Carolyn was his spouse).  If anything, 
it would seem that this same attitude may explain why they used 
unnecessarily severe corporal punishment when three very 
young children failed to measure up to their exacting standards.  
In any event, it was the jury that found that Defendants agreed to 
endanger—and endangered—the welfare of Joshua, J, and C, 
which, as the jury instructions indicated, resulted in a number of 
serious injuries and medical condition.  How could one say that, 
because a defendant acted in a courteous manner, he or she was 
incapable of committing a “monstrosity”—when the jury 
returned a guilty verdict on a charge that the defendant 
“knowingly caused harm to [a young child] by causing her to 
ingest excessive sodium and a sodium-laden substance while 
restricting her fluid intake, causing [the child] to suffer 
hypernatremia and dehydration, a life-threatening condition”?  
(A6028.)  Under these circumstances, we do not believe that the 
sentences were substantively reasonable.18 
                                              
 
18 However, we are also troubled by the government’s 
surprising references to both murmurs of outrage from the 
gallery when the sentences were announced and a press report 
claiming that the District Court had essentially negated the 
guilty verdict.  While the sentence imposed (and the process 
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IV. 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate the sentences 
imposed by the District Court and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion.   
 
                                                                                                     
used) should promote respect for the law, see § 3553(a)(2)(A), a 
judge obviously should not sentence someone in order to curry 
favor with the public or fail to exercise his or her own discretion 
under the three-step sentencing process so as to avoid public 
criticism.  Furthermore, a press report cannot be used as 
evidence that a court committed reversible error. 
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McKEE, Dissenting. 
 
It is impossible for anyone with an ounce of 
compassion to read through this transcript without becoming 
extraordinarily moved by allegations about what these 
children had to endure. Had the defendants been convicted of 
assault, or crimes necessarily involving conduct that was in 
the same “ballpark” as assault as defined under New Jersey 
law, I would readily agree that this matter had to be remanded 
for resentencing using the federal guidelines that govern 
assault. However, the district court held a ten and a half hour 
sentencing hearing in an extraordinarily difficult attempt to 
sort through the emotion and unproven allegations and 
sentence defendants for their crimes rather than the conduct 
the government alleged at trial and assumes in its brief. I 
believe the court appropriately did so pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 
§3553(a). Accordingly, I must respectfully dissent.  
Before I begin my discussion, however, I must note 
that the defendants in this case were acquitted of the only 
federal offenses with which they were charged: assault with a 
dangerous weapon, with intent to do bodily harm,1 and assault 
resulting in serious bodily injury.2 As I discuss more fully in 
Section II, these assault charges seem to drive the 
government’s argument and the Majority’s analysis. In order 
to minimize confusion about the precise nature of the charges 
in this case and the conduct that was proven, a chart listing 
each of the charges and their outcomes is attached as an 
                                                 
1 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3). 
2 Id. at § 113(a)(6). Both federal assault charges were 
dismissed when the district court granted judgments of 
acquittal at the close of the government’s case. 
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addendum to this dissent.3 
I. Sufficiently Analogous Offense Guideline Analysis 
The defendants were charged with what can accurately 
be described as incredibly inhumane treatment approaching 
(if not actually amounting to) torture of the minor children 
whose care and well-being had been entrusted to them. Since 
the defendants lived on a federal military installation, they 
were subject to federal law pursuant to the Assimilated 
Crimes Act.4   
 “When an assimilated state offense resembles conduct 
for which a sentencing guideline for a federal offense has 
been promulgated, the Sentencing Guidelines provide that 
‘the most analogous offense guideline’ should be applied.”5 
When it is thus necessary to select a “sufficiently analogous” 
offense guideline, I agree with the Majority’s adoption of an 
“elements-based” approach. The reasons for adopting that test 
are thoroughly explained in the Majority opinion.6 However, 
for reasons I will explain, I do not agree with my colleagues’ 
application of that test on this record. I think the Majority’s 
application of that test confuses the two steps of the analysis. 
It also fails to appreciate several reasons that a sweeping 
statute like New Jersey’s endangering the welfare of a child 
(“EWC”) statute cannot be sufficiently analogous to the 
offenses corresponding to the federal assault guidelines under 
                                                 
3 See Appendix, Table of Charges Against Carolyn & John 
Jackson. 
4 18 U.S.C. § 13(a). Given the Majority’s thorough discussion 
of the ACA, I need not reiterate its text or its historical 
development. See Maj. Slip Op. at 7–8.  
5 United States v. Finley, 531 F.3d 288, 292 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(quoting U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1). 
6 Maj. Slip Op. at 17–20. 
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the circumstances here. 
As we explained in United States v. Cothran, “there is 
a two-stop process involved [in sentencing for a conviction 
without a corresponding federal guideline]: first, the district 
court must determine whether there is a sufficiently 
analogous [federal] guideline, and, if there is, it must 
determine which guideline is most analogous.”7 These two 
steps are quite distinct. At step one, the court’s analysis is 
limited to a comparison of the elements of the state crime and 
any potentially analogous federal crimes. As the Court of 
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has explained, “[D]etermining 
whether there is a sufficiently analogous guideline to a 
particular crime is generally a task of comparing the elements 
of federal offenses to the elements of the crimes of 
conviction.” 8 
This step-one analysis may result in any one of three 
possible outcomes: (1) the court could determine that no 
guideline offenses are sufficiently analogous to the 
defendant’s conviction and apply the general sentencing 
                                                 
7 286 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2011) (explaining and then 
adopting the Eighth Circuit’s approach in United States v. 
Osborne, 164 F.3d 434 (8th Cir. 1999)). 
8 United States v. Allard, 164 F.3d 1146, 1149 (8th Cir. 
1999); see also United States v. Nichols, 169 F.3d 1255, 1270 
(10th Cir. 1999) (“Whether there is a sufficiently analogous 
guideline to a particular crime is generally a task of 
comparing the elements of the defendant’s crime of 
conviction to the elements of federal offenses already covered 
by a specific guideline. The determination on this point is a 
purely legal one, and the district court need not consider the 
underlying factual circumstances of the defendant’s case.” 
(citation omitted)). 
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provisions contained in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a);9 (2) the court 
could determine that only one guideline offense is sufficiently 
analogous to the crime of conviction and rely on that 
guideline to sentence the defendant;10 or (3) the court could 
determine that there is more than one sufficiently analogous 
guideline to guide its sentencing inquiry. In that situation, the 
court must then move to step two to select the guideline that 
is “sufficiently analogous” to the offense of conviction to 
justify sentencing pursuant to that guideline.11 Thus, the court 
only gets to step two if more than one federal crime has 
elements sufficiently analogous to the crime of conviction to 
justify fashioning a sentence that is guided by that federal 
                                                 
9 See, e.g., Finley, 531 F.3d at 289–90 (finding no sufficiently 
analogous federal guideline for “‘knowingly driving or 
operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of 
alcohol, third offense within ten years’” and “‘driving a motor 
vehicle on a highway while [his] operator’s license was 
suspended and/or revoked,’” in violation of Virginia law); 
United States v. Reyes, 48 F.3d 435, 437-38 (9th Cir. 1995) 
(finding no sufficiently analogous federal guideline for the 
state offense of driving without a license). 
10 See, e.g., United States v. Calbat, 266 F.3d 358, 362-63 
(5th Cir. 2001) (applying “aggravated assault” guideline to an 
Assimilative Crimes Act conviction for “intoxication 
assault”); United States v. Queensborough, 227 F.3d 149, 152 
n.2 (3d Cir. 2000) (applying “criminal sexual abuse” 
guideline to an Assimilative Crimes Act conviction for 
“aggravated rape”). 
11 See, e.g., United States v. Terry, 86 F.3d 353, 357-58 (4th 
Cir. 1996) (comparing “aggravated assault” guideline and 
“property damage or destruction” guideline to an Assimilative 
Crimes Act conviction for “shooting at an occupied vehicle”). 
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crime. At step two, a court may expand its view of the state 
crime to include the actual conduct to determine which of 
several potentially analogous crimes is the most analogous.12 
Indeed, it must do so in order to arrive at an appropriate 
sentence. Here, the district court did not find any sufficiently 
analogous guideline under step one (the first potential 
outcome described above), and therefore never moved to step 
two, where consideration of actual conduct would have been 
both necessary and appropriate.  
Given the circumstances surrounding these 
convictions, the government’s argument addresses the inquiry 
at step one. The government claims that the state crimes of 
conviction—EWC and conspiracy to commit EWC13—are 
sufficiently analogous to offenses corresponding to the 
federal assault and aggravated assault guidelines to require 
application of those guidelines. As we have explained, when 
discussing whether a state crime14 is analogous to a federal 
                                                 
12 Osborne, 164 F.3d at 439 (“In determining the most 
analogous guideline under USSG § 2X5.1, a district court is 
to look not merely to the definition of the offenses, but also to 
the actual conduct of the individual defendant.”). 
13 As discussed more thoroughly in Section II.A, though the 
defendants were charged with two counts of federal assault, 
the district court granted judgments of acquittal on those two 
counts, and they were never submitted to the jury. 
14 It is important to note that many cases dealing with 
U.S.S.G. § 2X5.1’s “most analogous offense guideline” 
provision deal not with state crimes that have been 
assimilated into federal law under the ACA, but with 
sentencing for federal crimes without any corresponding 
guideline.  See, e.g., Cothran, 286 F.3d at 176–78 (affirming 
district court’s conclusion that conveying false information 
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guidelines offense, our sister circuit courts of appeals have 
compared the elements of the crime of conviction to the 
elements of one or more federal crimes. 15 Here, however, the 
                                                                                                             
and threats about carrying an explosive device on an airplane 
under 49 U.S.C. § 46507 was most analogous to crimes 
corresponding to U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1, which is applicable to 
“Threatening or Harassing Communications”); United States 
v. McEnry, 659 F.3d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 2011) (finding that 
district court erred in holding federal crime of “‘knowingly 
and willfully serv[ing] . . . as an airman without an airman’s 
certificate authorizing the individual to serve in that 
capacity’” under 49 U.S.C. § 46306(b)(7) was most 
analogous to crimes corresponding to U.S.S.G. § 2A5.2, 
which applies to “Interference with Flight Crew Member of 
Flight Attendant; Interference with Dispatch, Navigation, 
Operation, or Maintenance of Mass Transportation Vehicle”); 
United States v. Rakes, 510 F.3d 1280, 1287-90 (10th Cir. 
2007) (affirming district court’s conclusion that conspiracy to 
impede or injure an officer under 18 U.S.C. § 372 was most 
analogous to crimes corresponding to U.S.S.G. § 2A6.1(a)(1), 
which covers certain crimes involving threatening or 
harassing communications); Nichols, 169 F.3d at 1269–76 
(affirming district court’s conclusion that conspiring to use 
weapon of mass destruction under 18 U.S.C. § 2332a was 
most analogous to first-degree murder and U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1). 
Because these cases are not quite the same as cases wherein a 
state statute is assimilated into federal law, I have focused my 
analysis on the latter. 
15 See, e.g., Calbat, 266 F.3d at 363 (comparing intoxication 
assault under Texas law to the federal offense of aggravated 
assault involving serious bodily injury); Osborne, 164 F.3d at 
438–39 (comparing vehicular battery under South Dakota law 
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government does not point to a single specific federal offense 
that has elements sufficiently analogous to New Jersey’s 
definition of EWC to justify using the federal assault 
guideline to determine these defendants’ sentences for 
conviction of that state offense. Instead, the government 
concludes that the federal assault and aggravated assault 
guidelines, which apply to 41 different sections in the 
Statutory Index,16 generally cover the same crimes 
encompassed within the EWC statute. However, such blanket 
assertions are no substitute for the kind of side-by-side 
comparison of elements that the first step of the elements-
based approach requires.17 Moreover, as discussed below, an 
attempt to define the myriad types of conduct criminalized 
under the EWC statute as assault, and equate the two 
dissimilar offenses, overlooks the sweeping nature of the 
EWC statute and the imprecision that would result from the 
government’s approach. 
New Jersey defines the crime of EWC in two statutes: 
N.J.S.A. §§ 2C:24-4a and 9:6-1. Section 2C:24-4a(2) defines 
the crime itself:  
Any person having a legal duty for the care of a child or who 
has assumed responsibility for the care of a child who causes 
the child harm that would make the child an abused or 
neglected child as defined in R.S.9:6-1, R.S.9:6-3 and P.L. 
                                                                                                             
to the federal offense of assault resulting in serious bodily 
injury); Allard, 164 F.3d at 1149 (comparing vehicular 
battery under South Dakota law to the federal offense of 
involuntary manslaughter). 
16 The Statutory Index specifies which sentencing guideline 
matches the federal statute of conviction. 
17 See Calbat, 266 F.3d at 363; Allard, 164 F.3d at 1149; 
Osborne, 164 F.3d 434 at 437. 
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1974, c. 119, § (C.9:6-8.21) is guilty of a crime of the second 
degree.18 
 
Accordingly, here, the jury instructions required the jury to 
find the following elements beyond a reasonable doubt in 
order to find Carolyn and John guilty: 
1. That [J.J.#2, J.J.#3, and C.J.#3] were children; 
2. That the defendant knowingly caused the child harm that 
would make the child neglected or knowingly committed an 
act of cruelty against the child; 
3. That the defendant knew that such conduct would cause the 
child harm or would inflict cruelty upon the child; and 
4. That the defendant had a legal duty for the care of the child or 
had assumed responsibility for the care of the child.19 
 
For the second element, the jury was instructed that Section 
9:6-120 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated defines cruelty 
                                                 
18 N.J.S.A. § 2C:24-4(a)(2). 
19 A6009. 
20 The jury instructions are almost word-for-word recitations 
of the statutory definitions of cruelty and neglect, as defined 
in N.J.S.A. § 9:6-1: 
 
Cruelty to a child shall consist in any of the 
following acts: (a) inflicting unnecessarily 
severe corporal punishment upon a child; (b) 
inflicting upon a child unnecessary suffering or 
pain, either mental or physical; (c) habitually 
tormenting, vexing or afflicting a child; (d) any 
willful act of omission or commission whereby 
unnecessary pain and suffering, whether mental 
or physical, is caused or permitted to be 
 9 
 
as consisting of any of the following acts performed by 
anyone having custody or control of the child: 
(a) Inflicting unnecessarily severe corporal punishment upon a 
child; 
(b) Inflicting upon a child unnecessary suffering or pain, either 
mental or physical; 
(c) Habitually tormenting, vexing or afflicting a child; 
                                                                                                             
inflicted on a child; (e) or exposing a child to 
unnecessary hardship, fatigue or mental or 
physical strains that may tend to injure the 
health or physical or moral well-being of such 
child. 
 
Neglect of a child shall consist in any of the 
following acts, by anyone having the custody or 
control of the child: (a) willfully failing to 
provide proper and sufficient food, clothing, 
maintenance, regular school education as 
required by law, medical attendance or surgical 
treatment, and a clean and proper home, or (b) 
failure to do or permit to be done any act 
necessary for the child's physical or moral well-
being. Neglect also means the continued 
inappropriate placement of a child in an 
institution, as defined in section 1 of P.L.1974, 
c. 119 (C. 9:6-8.21), with the knowledge that 
the placement has resulted and may continue to 
result in harm to the child's mental or physical 
well-being. 
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(d) Any act of omission or commission whereby unnecessary 
pain and suffering, whether mental or physical, is caused or 
permitted to be inflicted on a child; or 
(e) Exposing a child to unnecessary hardship, fatigue or mental 
or physical strains that may tend to injure the health or 
physical or moral well-being of such child.21 
The jury instructions then defined neglect as “any of the 
following acts, by anyone having the custody or control of the 
child:” 
(a) Failing to provide proper and sufficient food, clothing, 
maintenance . . . medical attendance or surgical treatment . . . 
or 
(b) Failure to do or permit to be done any act necessary for the 
child’s physical well-being.22 
In sum, to be guilty of second degree EWC under New Jersey 
law, a defendant must have knowingly harmed or neglected a 
child for whom he or she had a legal duty of care, in the 
manner set forth in the statutes. And the statute itself defines 
at least a dozen acts that would satisfy those elements. 
 In contrast, federal assault proscribes a much more 
limited and focused type of conduct. The federal crime of 
assault that the government seems to want the defendants to 
be sentenced for is defined as follows:  
1) Simple assault of an individual under 16 years old;23 or 
2) Assault resulting in substantial bodily injury to an individual 
                                                 
21 A6010.  There is a line drawn through the words “or moral” 
in Section (e) of the jury instructions, the word “moral” is 
circled, and there is a check mark in the margin.  It is unclear 
whether these words were therefore omitted from the jury 
instructions. 
22 Id. at 6011. 
23 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(5). 
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under 16 years old.24 
 
The lesser of these crimes, the crime of simple assault, “is not 
defined anywhere in the federal criminal code,” but “has been 
held to ‘embrace the common law meaning of that term.’”25 
At common-law, simple assault is a crime “‘committed by 
either a willful attempt to inflict injury upon the person of 
another, or by a threat to inflict injury upon the person of 
another which, when coupled with an apparent present ability, 
causes a reasonable apprehension of immediate bodily 
harm.’”26 For the second potentially analogous crime, assault 
resulting in substantial bodily injury, the statute defines 
“substantial bodily injury” as either “temporary but 
substantial disfigurement” or “temporary but substantial loss 
or impairment of the function of any bodily member, organ, 
or mental faculty.”27 Though I agree with my colleagues’ 
conclusion that the EWC and federal assault offenses need 
not be a perfect match, there are nevertheless irreconcilable 
problems that prohibit the elements of the assault offenses 
from being viewed as sufficiently analogous to the elements 
                                                 
24 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(7).  Defendants were acquitted of the 
related charge of 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6), which prohibits 
“[a]ssault resulting in serious bodily injury” without the 
requirement that the victim be under 16 years of age.   
25 United States v. Chestaro, 197 F.3d 600, 605 (2d Cir. 1999) 
(quoting United States v. Stewart, 568 F.2d 501, 504 (6th Cir. 
1978)); see also United States v. Estrada-Fernandez, 150 
F.3d 491, 494 n.1 (5th Cir. 1998); United States v. Juvenile 
Male, 930 F.2d 727, 728 (9th Cir. 1991). 
26 United States v. McCulligan, 256 F.3d 97, 103 (quoting 
Chestaro, 197 F.3d at 605). 
27 18 U.S.C. § 113(b)(1)(A)-(B). 
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of EWC for sentencing purposes under the ACA.  
There are so many ways to violate New Jersey’s EWC 
statute that claiming the statute’s elements are sufficiently 
analogous to the elements of federal assault for ACA 
purposes oversimplifies the crime of EWC, and redefines it to 
such an extent that the resulting crime bears almost no 
resemblance to the crime defined by the New Jersey 
legislature or the policy behind it. Where, as here, the state 
criminalizes a wide variety of conduct, the inquiry must be 
whether any iteration of the state crime would necessarily 
constitute a violation of the federal offense. The district court 
correctly concluded that is just not the case here. I realize, of 
course, that “assaulting” one’s child could potentially (but, as 
discussed below, not necessarily) constitute a violation of the 
EWC statute, but that is only one of numerous ways New 
Jersey’s statute would be violated; the disconnect between 
such conduct and the elements of assault under federal law is 
just too great to consider one to be sufficiently analogous to 
the other to control sentencing for EWC under New Jersey 
law.   
The district court recognized that none of the federal 
assault offenses are aimed at many of the particular elements 
of EWC. For example, the federal assault statute does not 
proscribe crimes of neglect, like the failure of a child’s 
caregiver to provide proper meals, schooling, medical 
attention, or clothing. Nor does it prohibit many of the acts of 
cruelty, such as “[h]abitually tormenting, vexing or afflicting 
a child” or “[e]xposing a child to unnecessary hardship, 
fatigue, or mental or physical strains,” that are elements of 
EWC.28   No definition of assault, no matter how expansive, 
includes such elements. Yet, such conduct would constitute a 
                                                 
28 N.J.S.A. § 9:6-1. 
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clear violation of New Jersey’s EWC statute. The Majority’s 
conclusion that EWC is sufficiently analogous to assault 
oversimplifies the former statute’s wide sweep while 
simultaneously ignoring and obfuscating its breadth. 
This incongruence is amplified and best illustrated by 
the fact that New Jersey actually permits some “assault” 
under the EWC statute. The statute criminalizes “inflicting 
unnecessarily severe corporal punishment upon a child.”29 
Thus, moderate corporal punishment would not constitute a 
violation of the statute. Indeed, severe corporal punishment 
would fall outside the reach of the EWC statute as long as it 
could also be deemed “necessarily severe.” And yet, such 
sanctioned corporal punishment would definitely satisfy the 
elements of federal assault. EWC is clearly focused upon the 
unique attributes of the parent/child relationship, and the 
district court clearly recognized that and struggled with that 
concept in determining whether there was a sufficiently 
analogous guideline offense for this state crime. The statute’s 
nuanced treatment of corporal punishment makes a finding 
that federal assault is sufficiently analogous to the EWC 
statute even more unsatisfactory.  
Finally, even if the district court were to look at the 
actual conduct in this case—which it properly refrained from 
doing under step one of an elements-based approach—it 
would still be unable to conclude that every count of EWC in 
this case constituted assault. According to both the indictment 
and the jury verdict sheet, I agree that the jury found that the 
defendants endangered the welfare of their three adopted 
children by “assaulting [them] with various objects and with 
their hands,”30 though I must note that the jury was given no 
                                                 
29 Id. (emphasis added). 
30 A34–53, 6054–61. 
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guidance as to the definition of “assault.”31 But none of the 
other EWC elements in this case would constitute assault. 
The defendants were convicted of withholding sufficient food 
and water, forcing the children to ingest hot sauce and red 
pepper flakes, and withholding prompt and proper medical 
care.32 Though these descriptions are appalling, they simply 
do not constitute assault. I readily concede that the 
helplessness of these young children, the brutality that was 
alleged, and the extraordinarily unsympathetic nature of these 
“parents,” all combine to make it very tempting to simply 
conclude that these kids were assaulted and to conclude that 
the guideline for assault should have guided the court’s 
sentencing inquiry. However, although assault is one of many 
ways one can endanger the welfare of a child under New 
Jersey law, the defendants here were never convicted of 
assault (though that crime was included in the indictment), 
and the evidence of numerous other types of cruelty clearly 
satisfy the elements of the crimes the defendants were 
convicted of.   
For the foregoing reasons, I conclude that the crime of 
EWC is simply not sufficiently analogous to the crimes 
corresponding to the federal assault guidelines, and the 
gruesome nature of the charges does not alter that fact.  
II. Other Concerns 
Though my main concern in writing separately is to 
express my agreement with the district court’s conclusion that 
there is no sufficiently analogous guideline to apply in this 
case, I would be remiss if I did not also mention other 
                                                 
31 See Section II.A for a further discussion of the jury 
instructions in this case. 
32 See Appendix, Table of Charges Against Carolyn & John 
Jackson. 
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concerns: first, the role that acquitted conduct plays here; 
second, the appropriateness of the district court’s refusal to 
find facts after determining that there was no sufficiently 
analogous guideline in this case; and finally, the irony of the 
government’s opposition to allowing the jury to characterize 
the degree of the victims’ harm.33 
A. Acquitted Conduct & Unproven Harm 
There is an unspoken argument here that, even though 
defendants were acquitted of federal assault, the court could 
consider the allegations of assault in imposing a sentence 
under the doctrine of acquitted conduct, and that evidence 
should have been considered by the district court when 
determining whether the assault guideline was sufficiently 
analogous.34 Not only would the examination of particular 
conduct in step one of the sufficiently analogous analysis 
have been improper, given the conduct the defendants were 
                                                 
33 Because, as the Majority explains, “[o]ur preferred course 
of action upon finding procedural error is to remand the case 
for resentencing, without considering the substantive 
reasonableness of the sentence imposed,” I refrain from 
reaching the substantive unreasonableness of the sentence 
here, where the Majority’s finding of procedural error alone 
provides basis for remanding. Maj. Slip Op. at 53. 
34 Almost as an aside the government suggests that the district 
court should have sanctioned the defendants for conduct they 
were not convicted of under the doctrine of acquitted conduct. 
See Gov’t Br. at 44–5 (“Indeed, courts may even include facts 
that might have formed the basis for acquitted counts, as well 
as entirely separate uncharged offenses.” (citing United States 
v. Watts, 519 U.S. 148, 149 (1997) (per curiam); United 
States v. Grier, 475 F.3d 556, 565–68 (3d Cir. 2007) (en 
banc))). 
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acquitted of, the district court correctly concluded that 
attempts to retroactively shoehorn their conduct into the 
assault guideline is akin to “fitting a square peg into a round 
hole.”35 
As established in United States  v. Watts—a decision 
that included review of two cases: Watts and Putra—a 
sentencing court may consider conduct a defendant has been 
acquitted of, so long as that conduct has been proven by a 
preponderance of the evidence.36 In Watts, police discovered 
cocaine base and two loaded guns in Watts’s house. A jury 
convicted Watts of possession with intent to distribute,37 but 
acquitted him of using a firearm in relation to a drug 
offense.38 During sentencing, the district court found by a 
preponderance of the evidence that Watts had possessed the 
guns in connection with the drug offense and accordingly 
applied a guideline for that conduct that added two points to 
his base offense level. 39 In Putra, authorities had videotaped 
two instances of Putra and her codefendant selling cocaine to 
a government informant. The jury convicted Putra of aiding 
and abetting with intent to distribute one ounce of cocaine on 
May 8, 1992, but acquitted her on a second count of the same 
crime on May 9, 1992. At sentencing, the district court found 
by a preponderance of the evidence that Putra had been 
involved in the May 9th transaction and calculated her base 
offense level by aggregating the amounts of both sales.40 The 
                                                 
35 A6588.  
36 519 U.S. 148, 157 (1997); see also U.S. v. Grier, 475 F.3d 
556, 561 (3d Cir. 2011). 
37 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). 
38 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). 
39 519 U.S. at 150. 
40 Id. at 150–51. 
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Supreme Court later upheld these sentencing decisions.41 
Here, as my colleagues explain, the crimes alleged in 
the fifteen-count superseding indictment that was filed against 
the defendants “can be organized into three different 
categories: an assimilated state conspiracy charge [for which 
they were both convicted], assimilated state substantive 
offenses [of endangering the welfare of a child, for which 
John was convicted of ten counts and Carolyn of twelve 
counts], and substantive charges under federal law.”42 The 
third category includes only one kind of charge: assault as 
defined under federal law in 18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3) 
(prohibiting assault with a dangerous weapon, with intent to 
do bodily harm) and § 113(a)(6) (assault resulting in serious 
bodily injury). As noted at the outset, the assault charges were 
dismissed when the district court granted judgments of 
acquittal on Counts 13–14 at the close of the government’s 
case.43 
Accordingly, the only conduct that was submitted to 
the jury for proof beyond a reasonable doubt was the conduct 
alleged in counts charging endangering the welfare of a child 
under New Jersey law, N.J.S.A. §§ 2C:24-4A and 9:6-1,  and 
Count 1, charging conspiracy to do so. Importantly, the jury 
                                                 
41 Id. at 157 (reversing circuit court judgments and remanding 
for further proceedings consistent with the opinion). 
42 Maj. Slip Op. at 4. 
43 The defendants were also acquitted of additional counts of 
child endangerment—John was acquitted of Counts 2, 10 and 
renumbered 13, while Carolyn Jackson was also acquitted of 
renumbered Count 13. After the district court entered a 
judgment of acquittal on Counts 13 and 14 at the close of the 
government’s case, the original Count 15 was renumbered 
Count 13 on the verdict sheet. 
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was neither instructed on, nor required to find, the elements 
of any kind of assault. Moreover, both defendants were 
affirmatively acquitted of assault resulting in substantial 
bodily injury, one of the offenses the government points to as 
sufficiently analogous to the EWC convictions. 
It goes without saying that “[o]nly if a jury of an 
individual’s peers concludes beyond a reasonable doubt that 
he or she committed each element of the charged offense, as 
defined by the legislature, may the court impose 
punishment.”44 Therefore, jury instructions must contain all 
the essential elements of the crimes charged.45 And yet, 
despite the absence of any pertinent jury instructions, and 
despite the acquittals on federal assault offenses, the 
government now asks us to force the district court to sentence 
these defendants as if the jury had found them guilty of 
assault. The district court quite correctly resisted that 
invitation, and so should we.  
Unlike the issue in Watts regarding the calculation of 
the proper base offense level, the district court’s task in 
                                                 
44 Grier, 475 F.3d at 562 (citing U.S. v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 
230 (2005)) 
45 See, e.g., Chambers v. McDaniel, 549 F.3d 1191, 1201 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (holding defendant’s federal constitutional due 
process right was violated because jury instructions permitted 
jury to convict him of first-degree murder without finding 
separately all three elements of the crime: willfulness, 
deliberation, and premeditation); United States v. Thornton, 
539 F.3d 741, 748-51 (7th Cir. 2008) (reversing convictions 
for attempted bank robbery and possessing a firearm in 
furtherance of a crime of violence because jury instruction on 
the bank-robbery charge failed to include essential element of 
actual intimidation). 
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sentencing under the ACA occurs much earlier in the 
sentencing process. The real question a sentencing judge is 
attempting to answer at step one of the sufficiently analogous 
guideline analysis is, “Which federal crime—if any—has 
analogous elements to the state crime of conviction?” In the 
cases consolidated in Watts, there was no question as to 
which guideline to use, as the defendants were convicted of 
federal crimes that had already been assigned specific 
guidelines. In this case, however, the defendants were 
convicted of state crimes that did not have a corresponding 
federal guideline. Thus, as discussed above, the court had to 
determine if the elements of New Jersey’s EWC statute were 
so similar to the elements of the federal assault statute that, 
for sentencing purposes, a violation of one could fairly guide 
sentencing a violation of the other. For all the reasons 
explained in Section I, the district court was correct in 
concluding that sentencing discretion under one should not be 
guided by guidelines established for elements of the largely 
dissimilar other.  
B. Fact-Finding 
Because there was no sufficiently analogous guideline 
in this case, the district court was not required to conduct the 
kind of fact-finding necessary to determine the applicability 
of guideline adjustments. I agree that this second claim of 
error is “moot if this Court finds that the [district court] 
correctly determined that there was no sufficiently analogous 
guideline,”46 which I believe it did. Both the government’s 
argument and the Majority’s conclusion regarding the 
necessity of fact-finding here disregards the fact that this case 
was not a guidelines case, and that the district court “properly 
followed §2X5.1’s explicit instructions by sentencing 
                                                 
46 John Br. at 30. 
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according to § 3553.”47 
I also take issue with the government’s cited support 
for its argument that the district court erred in refusing to find 
facts. The government notes that the district court disregarded 
“all the [Pre-Sentence Report] paragraphs discussing the 
offenses.”48 But the district court had sound reason for doing 
that, which the government fails to mention.  The government 
conceded that the statement of facts section of the PSR was 
drafted by the prosecution.49 The district court found it was “a 
description of the offense conduct taken from the 
government’s narrative without any investigation by 
presentence,” and it “wasn’t helpful” because “[i]t was 
argument.”50 The court’s actions were appropriate given its 
conclusion that there was “a real problem with saying that 
this is what was proven without judicial factfinding nailing it 
                                                 
47 Id. at 32 (citing A6589 (excerpt from sentencing transcript 
where district court explains decision to sentence according to 
§3553 and states this was “not some kind of United States 
versus Koon [situation] where I’m saying this is just so unfair, 
I’m going to make up this mechanism and then we’ll make it 
stick . . . . This is in the guidelines. The guidelines in 2X5.1 
anticipated there would be a time, under the ACA or some 
other assimilative statute where we might have to do this.”)). 
See Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81 (1996). 
48 Gov’t Br. at 43 n.19. 
49 A6072 (prosecution admitting to writing statement of facts 
during motion hearing), A6740 (same during sentencing 
hearing). Though the government stated that its composition 
of the PSR’s statement of facts is “what is done in almost 
every PSR in this District,” the district court disagreed. 
A6740–41. 
50 A6738–39. 
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down because that’s not what a jury found.”51 The court had 
every right to refuse to rely on a document that it believed 
was more the result of the government’s advocacy than an 
objective effort to assist the court at sentencing. It is clear 
from the sentencing hearing that the district court was not 
convinced by a preponderance of the evidence of all of the 
conduct that the government had alleged and relied on for 
sentencing purposes. Thus, after discovering that “Probation 
did no independent investigation at all regarding those facts,” 
the district court was correct to ignore the PSR’s statement of 
facts and base a sentence on the elements of the offenses that 
were proven at trial.52 
C. A Final Irony 
Before concluding, I think it is important to emphasize 
something about the government’s argument here. It is a 
position that is ironic at best, and disingenuous at worst. 
During the trial, the defense asked the court to have the jury 
return a verdict with interrogatories that would have shown 
the specific harm the jury was convinced had been proven. 53 
                                                 
51 A6739. 
52 A6740. 
53 A5468–70. This discussion included reference to N.J.S.A. § 
9:6-8.21(c), which defines “abused or neglected child,” in 
relevant part, as: 
 
[A] child less than 18 years of age whose parent 
or guardian, as herein defined, (1) inflicts or 
allows to be inflicted upon such child physical 
injury by other than accidental means which 
causes or creates a substantial risk of death, or 
serious or protracted disfigurement, or 
protracted impairment of physical or emotional 
 22 
 
In the end, the government successfully opposed the 
defendants’ request that the jury make specific findings as to 
the degree of harm allegedly caused by the defendants.54 The 
government later explained that “certain things, such as 
degree of harm or danger are historically elements of assault, 
                                                                                                             
health or protracted loss or impairment of the 
function of any bodily organ; (2) creates or 
allows to be created a substantial or ongoing 
risk of physical injury to such child by other 
than accidental means which would be likely to 
cause death or serious or protracted 
disfigurement, or protracted loss or impairment 
of the function of any bodily organ; . . . . (4) or 
a child whose physical, mental, or emotional 
condition has been impaired or is in imminent 
danger of becoming impaired as the result of the 
failure of his parent or guardian, as herein 
defined, to exercise a minimum degree of care 
(a) in supplying the child with adequate food, 
clothing, shelter, education, medical or surgical 
care though financially able to do so or though 
offered financial or other reasonable means to 
do so, or (b) in providing the child with proper 
supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably 
inflicting or allowing to be inflicted harm, or 
substantial risk thereof, including the infliction 
of excessive corporal punishment; or by any 
other acts of a similarly serious nature requiring 
the aid of the court . . . . 
 
54 See A5457–72 (government’s argument), A5477–78, 
5485–88 (court rejecting defendants’ request). 
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they are not elements of the crimes for which these 
defendants were convicted.”55 Yet, the government now 
complains because the court refused to sentence the 
defendants for assault. Moreover, the government’s objection 
prevented any additional fact-finding by the jury that would 
have established the harm that was actually proven. Whether 
the government was motivated by a concern about having to 
prove conduct that was not an element of the crimes charged, 
or whether the objection was a tactic to allow it to later have 
the court sentence the defendant for conduct without bearing 
the burden of proving it beyond a reasonable doubt, it cannot 
be disputed that the objection created the possibility that the 
district court may not have been sufficiently convinced of the 
degree of harm caused by defendants to analogize the 
elements of EWC under New Jersey law to the elements of 
the federal assault statute.  That, in fact, is what happened. 
On appeal, it is no less difficult to determine the 
precise harm that was proven. As the Majority notes, “[g]iven 
the expansive nature of the child endangerment instructions 
as well as the allegations against [d]efendants (involving 
numerous acts of abuse committed over the course of a five-
year conspiracy), we recognize the difficulty in connecting 
each count with a specific incident or a particular injury or 
condition.”56 This difficulty is due, in part, to an unresolved 
dispute regarding the causation of the children’s injuries and 
medical conditions.57 Additionally, the government again 
contributes to the difficulty by repeatedly citing in its brief 
the very sections of the PSR that the court refused to rely on 
                                                 
55 A6460. 
56 Maj. Slip Op. at 56. 
57 See Maj. Slip Op. at 57 (acknowledging that “the parties . . 
. contest causation”).  
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during sentencing.58 As the defendants point out, the brief 
reiterates much of the harm that defendants allegedly caused, 
but we are left with no way of knowing what was actually 
proven; especially since the counts charging assault were 
dismissed and never even submitted to the jury.  
One of the more egregious examples of the 
government’s exaggeration of the harm found by the jury is 
its treatment of Joshua’s death. At trial, the court excluded all 
references to Joshua’s death—a fact that is not noted in the 
Majority opinion—as the government did not charge the 
defendants with causing his death. In fact, the first trial in this 
case ended in a mistrial, when the government “inadvertently 
asked a question suggesting Joshua was no longer alive.”59 
During sentencing here, the district court admonished the 
government for arguing that the court should consider 
Joshua’s death when calculating the sentence: 
I do not believe that the government has a right to ask me to 
sentence as if the parents contributed to the death of Joshua. . 
. . [T]he government walked away from proving a death case 
and couldn’t get an expert to opine that they caused his death 
and rather backdoor that into this case.60 
 
And yet, the government now argues on appeal that the 
defendants “contributed to [Joshua’s] death.”61 Indeed, even 
the Majority concedes that “[t]he government admittedly does 
read too much into the jury’s verdict.”62 The government’s 
continued refusal to accept the limitations of the jury’s 
                                                 
58 Gov’t Br. at 6–8, 72 n.34. 
59 Gov’t Br. at 17 n.8. 
60 A6695. 
61 Gov’t Br. at 45; see also id. at 54, 75. 
62 Maj. Slip Op. at 56. 
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findings is one of the main reasons sentencing was so 
challenging in this case. The district court very carefully 
sorted through all of this in a ten-and-a-half-hour sentencing 
hearing. Given the complexities and ambiguities of this case, 
I cannot conclude the court erred or abused its discretion. To 
the contrary, the court recognized the disconnect between the 
endangering the welfare of a child statute that the defendants 
were convicted of and the counts charging federal assault that 
were all dismissed. The court then tried to fashion a sentence 
that was consistent with the principles set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 
3553(a), the general federal sentencing statute. I certainly do 
not agree with everything the court said during that ten-and-a-
half-hour inquiry, but I do not think the court erred or abused 
its discretion in fashioning these sentences.  
Indeed, the district court did the best it could in this 
situation. The government charged the defendants with 
federal assault; the district court granted judgments of 
acquittal on the two federal assault charges. The district 
court’s rationale for granting acquittal on the assault charges 
parallels the reasoning that an elements-based approach does 
not permit a finding that the federal assault guideline is 
sufficiently analogous to the crime of EWC. The court 
explained:  
I find that the activity is not of an ilk to constitute . . . an 
assault as that activity or conduct as contemplated in the 
statute.  I find that the combination of events, withholding or 
activities withholding water, administering hot sauce, 
watching [the child] decline and not doing anything about it 
does not constitute battery, or would put a victim in the 
apprehension of immediate bodily harm.63 
 
                                                 
63 A5444. 
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Despite the district court’s ruling, the government requests 
that we now require the district court to resentence defendants 
according to guidelines intended to guide sentences imposed 
for the very offense defendants were acquitted of. I am 
unwilling to do so.64 
  As I conceded at the outset, this is a horrendous case in 
which the most innocent among us had to endure atrocious 
neglect and cruelty. As Justice Holmes stated over 100 years 
ago, “hard cases . . . make bad law.”65 Because of the 
ambiguities in the jury’s verdict and the breadth of harm 
included in the state offense the defendants were convicted 
of, this case is as hard as it is tragic. But I cannot agree with 
my colleagues’ conclusion that the district court erred in 
imposing these sentences. Accordingly,  
I must respectfully dissent from the opinion of my colleagues.
                                                 
64 The district court explained its similar finding “that trying 
to push findings that would comfortably make the conduct 
aggravated assault and going from there under the guidelines 
offends fairness to allow the government to charge one thing 
and a lower standard of proof to prove something much 
harsher and come away with a sentence much greater than the 
jury verdict necessarily leads to with the Judge leading the 
charge saying oh, yes, it does, because I’m making these 
findings.” A6588. 
65 Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197, 364 
(1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
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APPENDIX 
 
Charges Against Carolyn & John Jackson 
 
Count Charged Crime Superseding Indictment Description66 
Carolyn’s 
Outcome 
John’s 
Outcome 
1 Conspiracy to 
Endanger the 
Welfare of a Child  
N.J.S.A. § 2C:5-2 
 
Guilty Guilty 
2 Endangering the 
Welfare of a Child  
N.J.S.A. § 2C:24-4a 
“[W]ithholding sufficient nourishment 
and food from J.J.#2” Guilty Not Guilty 
3 Endangering the 
Welfare of a Child  
N.J.S.A. § 2C:24-4a 
“[P]hysically assaulting J.J.#2 with 
various objects and with their hands” Guilty Guilty 
4 Endangering the 
Welfare of a Child  
N.J.S.A. § 2C:24-4a 
 “[W]ithholding adequate water . . . and 
prohibiting J.J.#3 from drinking water” Guilty Guilty 
5 Endangering the 
Welfare of a Child  
N.J.S.A. § 2C:24-4a 
“[F]orcing J.J.#3 to ingest hot sauce, red 
pepper flakes, and raw onion” 
 
Guilty Guilty 
6 Endangering the 
Welfare of a Child  
N.J.S.A. § 2C:24-4a 
“[P]hysically assaulting J.J.#3 with 
various objects and with their hands” Guilty Guilty 
7 Endangering the 
Welfare of a Child 
N.J.S.A. § 2C:24-4a 
“[W]ithholding sufficient nourishment 
and food from C.J.#3” 
 
Guilty Guilty 
8 Endangering the 
Welfare of a Child  
N.J.S.A. § 2C:24-4a 
“[W]ithholding adequate water . . . and 
prohibiting C.J.#3 from drinking water” Guilty Guilty 
9 Endangering the 
Welfare of a Child 
N.J.S.A. § 2C:24-4a 
“[F]orcing C.J.#3 to ingest hot sauce and 
red pepper flakes” 
 
Guilty Guilty 
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10 Endangering the 
Welfare of a Child  
N.J.S.A. § 2C:24-4a 
“[C]ausing C.J.#3 to ingest excessive 
sodium and a sodium-laden substance 
while restricting [her] fluid intake, 
causing [her] to suffer hypernatremia 
and dehydration, a life-threatening 
condition” 
Guilty Not Guilty 
11 Endangering the 
Welfare of a Child  
N.J.S.A. § 2C:24-4a 
“[W]ithholding prompt and proper 
medical care for C.J.#3’s dehydration 
and elevated sodium levels” 
Guilty Guilty 
12 Endangering the 
Welfare of a Child 
N.J.S.A. § 2C:24-4a 
“[P]hysically assaulting C.J.#3 with 
various objects and with their hands” Guilty Guilty 
13 Assault 
18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(3) 
“[W]ith intent to do bodily harm 
assaulted C.J.#3 with a dangerous 
weapon” 
Judgement 
of 
Acquittal 
Judgment 
of 
Acquittal 
14 Assault 
18 U.S.C. § 113(a)(6) 
“[I]ntentionally assaulted C.J.#3, 
resulting in serious bodily injury” 
Judgement 
of 
Acquittal 
Judgement 
of 
Acquittal 
1567 Endangering the 
Welfare of a Child 
N.J.S.A. § 2C:24-4a 
“[W]ithholding prompt and proper 
medical care for C.J.#3’s fractured 
humerus” 
Not Guilty Not Guilty 
 
                                                 
67 After the district court entered a judgment of acquittal on Counts 13 and 14, the original 
Count 15 was renumbered Count 13 on the verdict sheet. 
